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1 Abstract
Recent literature contains many examples of reputation systems which are constructed in an
ad hoc way or rely upon some heuristic which has been found to be useful.  However,
comparisons between these reputation systems has been impossible because there are no
established methods of comparing performance.  This paper introduces a simulation
framework which can be used to perform comparison analysis between reputation models.
Two reputation models, one from Abdul-Rahman and Hailes (ARH) [1], and one from Mui,
Mohtashemi, and Halberstadt (MMH) [17] are implemented and compared with regard to
accuracy, performance and resistance to deception.  In order to improve performance in
certain cases, MMH is modified to distinguish the concept of “trust” from the concept of
“reputation.” Additionally we examine the results of shortening the memory of MMH in
order to improve results in environments that are constantly changing.
2 Introduction
2.1  Managing Trust with Reputation Systems
Trust is an elusive concept upon which researchers have repeatedly attempted to model in
their implementations of security technologies.  The global, hierarchical trust model of X.509
certificates [11] has not proved manageable enough to realize its initial vision for an
environment as large and dynamic as the Internet.  PGP incorporates a concept called the
Web of Trust [22], which is more dynamic, but still requires a lot of human interaction and
oversight. SPKI/SDSI [7] uses a dynamic model based on authorizations instead of identities,
but this has not seen widespread use, presumably because managing authorization is more
difficult than managing identities.
The advent of e-commerce and peer-to-peer (P2P) systems such as Gnutella has driven new
interest in reputation systems for managing trust between electronic trade partners and agents
in a P2P network. This approach is attractive because it models the way that trust often works
in the real world.  Additionally, the trust model dynamically maintains itself, and it can work
on both global and local levels.  This is important because, while pre-defined systems of trust
(such as PKI) can be provably secure, the effort to administer them is high and they are not as
secure as proven when deployed in the real world.  Reputation systems do not promise to be
perfectly secure, but can be used where there is no central authority to define security.
2.2  Comparing Reputation Systems
Reputation systems have often been defined in an ad hoc manner [18], yet measuring the
success of reputation systems is straightforward and offers insight into the validity of the
model. In this paper we create a test framework that can be generically applied to many kinds
of reputation systems, and we analyze two which are presented in recent literature.  The first
reputation system is one proposed by Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [1].  This model depicts
direct trust and recommender trust, as distinguished by the source of the reputation
information and assessed in a particular context. We will refer to this reputation system as
ARH throughout this thesis, and it is further described in section 6.1.
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The second reputation system to be examined will be the one presented by Mui, Mohtashemi,
and Halberstadt [17]  which defines reputation and trust as two distinct concepts and
incorporates reciprocity as the key driver for increases in reputation.  This reputation system
is described further in section 6.2 and is referred to as MMH throughout this thesis.  
2.3  Improving Reputation Systems
Some researchers distinguish between the concepts of reputation and trust: reputation is
considered to be the perceived likelihood of success in a transaction, while trust weighs the
degree of risk that a party is willing to subject itself to.  Thus trust might be considered the
minimum reputation required before conducting the transaction.  
When viewed this way, it is possible that managing an agent's level of trust will enable it to
minimize failure in a hostile environment. By way of analogy, it is quite natural for a person
who has been unsuccessful in one aspect of their life to retreat and be more cautious in other
areas of their life.  We propose a Trust Level Management scheme which mimics this real
world behavior of “once bitten, twice shy” with the hopes that it will be able to minimize
failures in a simulated environment.
Also, reputation systems are by their nature a reflection of historical behavior.  However,
historical behavior is sometimes a faulty indicator of future behavior.  We propose managing
the agent's level of experience in order to tune its ability to respond more appropriately to the
present situation, and not become mired in an outdated understanding of its environment.
These improvements are made to the MMH model and are described in detail in section 9.
We refer to the modified model as TMMH throughout this thesis.
3 Background
The study of reputation has its beginnings in the disciplines of sociology, economics, and
game theory.  Sociologists such as Deutch and Gambetta have provided the formal
definitions and theoretical background for understanding abstract concepts such as trust and
reputation and how they operate in our world.  Without this work it would be difficult to
focus efforts on implementing models that mean something to the people who use them.
Economists have applied repeated games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma (see [5] and section
7.4.1) to the idea of reputation to understand how concepts like reputation, trust, and
reciprocity work in the real world.  Economists such as Dellarocas, Friedman, and Resnick
have been among those expanding these efforts to study the effects of reputation in e-
commerce environments.
Computer scientists have taken the lead from these disciplines and have developed
mathematical models and network protocols to replicate the concepts defined by their
economist and sociologist colleagues.  This is the level at which this thesis addresses
reputation systems. 
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3.1  Applications
3.1.1  Internet Reputation Systems
One of the most widely known operating reputation systems is the one which enables eBay's
on-line auction system (http://www.ebay.com).  This system has been studied in [19], and has
been found to be successful despite its shortcomings.  Participants are incented to build a
good reputation, and it has been found that a good reputation as a seller results in higher
prices, and that good reputations do seem to lead to higher transaction volume.  Other on-line
reputation systems of note include product ratings at Amazon (http://www.amazon.com) and
buyer-supplier reputation clearinghouses such as Reputation.com.
3.1.2  Peer-to-peer Networking
Reputation models have been proposed as a method of trust for peer-to-peer network
environments in a number of papers such as [2] and [12]. Since these environments have no
central authorities, the use of reputation and referral as a mechanism of trust is appealing.
Additionally, reputation networks need not have a strong concept of identity in order to
operate.  For instance, a node’s identity can be ensured by public/private key pair that is self-
generated and validates later transactions as coming from the same party.
3.1.3  Anti-SPAM
Unsolicited commercial e-mail (SPAM) has generated a great deal of effort to respond to the
larger and larger volumes of unwanted e-mail.  One of the ways in which this is done is via
reputation.  One commercial example of this is BrightMail (http://www.brightmail.com),
which centrally and automatically maintains reputation information on mail hosts throughout
the Internet and allows customers to decline e-mail which originates from mail hosts that
have a bad reputation.
3.1.4  E-Commerce
Electronic commerce is a term which loosely describes all kinds of automated purchase
capabilities that operate over the Internet.  One of the visions of e-commerce is automated
competition in purchasing.  For instance a buyer may have a choice of multiple suppliers of
the same commodity item.  The supplier with the lowest price can easily be chosen through
an automated bidding algorithm.  However, reliability, service, and other elements of trust
factor into a business exchange, and these are not so easily automated.  A reputation system
can automate the vendor selection process in this case by ensuring that vendors with good
service, and not just low prices, win the bid.  Yu and Singh have applied their model to e-
commerce in [24].
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3.2  Attacks
It is well known that reputation is something that is easily attacked in the real world, and
automated reputation systems are no different.  The first issue for a reputation system to
contend with is identity, since an easy way to subvert the system is to assume the identity of
an agent that has a good reputation.  In an automated system public-key cryptography can be
of assistance here by allowing agents to identify themselves with a unique public key giving a
guarantee that others are indeed communicating with the same agent that has built up a good
reputation in the system. 
However, this does not solve all problems because, in an Internet environment, it is relatively
easy for an agent to shed its poor reputation by assuming a different identity.  Friedman and
Resnick [8] assert that reputation systems which require agents to “pay their dues” is a
fundamental aspect of a successful reputation-based economy. 
Also, the concept of reputation both stands and falls on the veracity of agents which provide
input to the system.  Deception of a number of different kinds might be considered:  first,
reputations may be overrated or underrated, second deception may be amplified by the
perception that the liar agent has a high reputation or has a large amount of experience.  It is
presumed that a reputation system will completely fail given enough deceptive input, but
resistance to deception is a desirable trait of a reputation system.
Deception may be a coordinated effort between two or more agents targeted at specific target
agents.  This type of attack is very difficult to recognize in a complex system with many
agents, and the deceptive information will skew all of the results.
Lastly, the “Sybil attack” is one described by Morselli, et. al. [15] in which an agent behaves
with a split personality, maintaining two distinct identities in an attempt to game the system
and fool other agents into supporting it with good reputation ratings.
4 Definitions
4.1   Reputation 
4.1.1  Intuition on Reputation
Reputation is an intuitive way of establishing and quantifying trust, however formalizing our
notions of reputation and trust are necessary in order to implement an automated reputation
system. 
In the real world, finding a reputable mechanic involves obtaining a reference from someone
that you trust.  However, reputation is contextual.  For instance, no matter how much you
trust your mechanic to fix your car, this does not automatically translate to trust when it
comes to obtaining medical advice.  Likewise, automated reputation systems should account
for context, and this is the approach taken by most, including [1] and [17].
Real world reputation may also be garnered personally, or transferred based on group
membership.  Reputation may be derived from a social network; in other words, our real
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world reputation with different individuals varies depending on the network of relationships
that tie us together. Similarly automated reputation-based systems may take group dynamics
into account.
Reputation may be influenced by direct or indirect information.  That is, you may evaluate
someone’s reputation based on direct encounters with them, or based on behavior that others
have observed.  One of the reputation systems recounted later [1] in this thesis has similar
concepts which it labels direct and recommender reputation.  Of course the only reliable
reputation information is direct, because it is based on first hand observation and is not
subject to exaggeration, deception, or rumors.
Also, a number of additional issues that influence reputation revolve around identity:  should
it be bad to have an unknown reputation?  Or is it simply a neutral situation? The models
studied approach this issue with different solutions, each with its advantages and
disadvantages.
Lastly, since the system relies on individuals telling the truth about each other, deception is a
significant challenge.  A society full of compulsive liars will quickly have no utility for
reputation.  Similarly, automated reputation models must be resistant to deception, and it is
anticipated that there is a minimum level of cooperation necessary for a reputation-based trust
system to function.  
4.1.2  Formal Definition
Many, such as Mui, et. al. [17], have equated reputation and trust, treating them as synonyms
in their work.  However, not all treatments have done this, so we define trust and reputation
separately.  Reputation b
a is defined as the expectation of success that an agent a has that
agent b will act in a beneficial way towards a.  
This definition of reputation follows closely upon the work done by Diego Gambetta, which
is also referenced in [14], which defines trust as a probability: “...trust (or symmetrically
distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that
another agent or a group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can
monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it)” [9].
However, in order to keep the simulation system generic, we will not suppose that b
a is
always a probability with values between 0 and 1.  Reputation b
a may be a member of an
ordered set of values V which describes both trust and distrust, or it may be a history of
interactions, or a cumulative rating with arbitrary values.  However, we will define some
functions that must be possible within a given reputation system in order to work in our
simulation.
• The function vouchFor(a,b) returns b
a∈V  for a given pair of agents a and b.  Each
agent must be capable of expressing its expectation of success when queried.
• Reputation systems must implement the operators <, >, and = to allow direct comparison
between reputation values.
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• Reputation values V must be partially ordered, i.e. they must exist on a continuum
between a defined min and max where min≤b
a≤max for all agents a and b.  Again,
min and max need not be single values, but could be sets that are evaluated such that
the comparison operators above are valid.
• If k
i represents the reputation value that agent i assigns to agent k, and k
j represents
the reputation value that agent j assigns to agent k, then the function combine k
i ,k
j 
must exist within a reputation system to allow a third party to combine reputation ratings
from two different agents.  Figure 1 depicts the communication that allows agent a to
combine ratings from agents i and j to develop an combined reputation about agent k.
Figure 1: Combining Reputations Ratings from Two Different Agents
While different reputation systems may have their unique characteristics, this simple set of
functions and operators is very prevalent in the systems described in the existing literature.
We will now go on to describe our notion of trust.
4.2  Trust
4.2.1  Intuition on Trust
Trust is defined in everyday parlance as “Firm reliance on the integrity, ability, or character
of a person or thing” [10]. While this definition strikes a hopeful tone, the alternative view is
voiced by the security professional's aphorism “trust is for suckers.” [6]  Either way, we see
the elements of a person's inability to fully predict or control the situation into which they
enter.  Trust is the decision to act despite uncertainty with a hope that the outcome will result
in your favor.
In the computer world, a trusted system is one in which verifications have taken place in
advance and a decision is made to connect to the system in an unrestricted way.  Trusted
domain hosts are those hosts for which no further scrutiny is required in advance of future
interactions.  And trusted certificates are those which have been signed by a known certificate
authority and therefore it has been decided that no further proof of authenticity is required.







ik = combine(ik , ik )
It is widely believed that cooperation in society is based on mutual trust.  A non-trusting
world would be one that is paralyzed, unable to move forward when there are no guarantees
of behavior on the part of our neighbors.  Distrust on the other hand is the inclination to avoid
uncertain interactions with the expectation that they would be harmful.  Typically trust of a
person may be founded on reputation, social mores, legal recourse, or an altruistic belief. 
4.2.2  Formal Definition
For a formal definition of trust we follow Marsh [14] in referencing Morton Deutsch, a
pioneer in studies of cooperation and competition.  Trust for Deutsch occurs when there is an
ambiguous set of choices and a good or bad result hangs in the balance and solely depends on
another person.  Trust is to go down the path expecting a good result.  Distrust is avoiding the
path.  Deutsch also defines the trust dilemma as being weighted by a bad outcome which
would be worse than the benefit to be derived.
Marsh formalizes this understanding by establishing upper and lower trust thresholds.  If trust
is quantified as t, there is an upper threshold tU, above which an agent would be trusting of
the interaction.  The lower threshold tL is the point at which the agent distrusts the interaction
with another, and any trust values t such that tL < t < tU are considered ambiguous [14].
First, since Marsh equates trust with reputation, as noted above, we define trust as existing on
the same continuum as reputation, so that min≤≤max   Also, we will simplify Marsh's
definition by making tL = tU, therefore eliminating ambiguity about behavior and defining
trust as the threshold at which a decision can be made concerning an ambiguous choice.  In
the context of a reputation system, trust ta is then the minimum expectation of success that
agent a is willing to accept prior to initiating an interaction with another agent.
5 Survey of Related Research
5.1  Theoretical Models of Reputation
5.1.1  Marsh
For his doctoral thesis in computer science [14], Stephen Marsh investigates the notions of
trust in various contexts and develops a formal description of its use with distributed,
intelligent agents.  The model he creates is complex, but draws on many relevant real world
phenomenon.  In doing so he defines trust in three categories: 
• Basic trust which is considered a value from -1 to 1 that encompasses the agent's
experiences and basic disposition to trust.  This is called “trust level” later in this thesis.
• General trust is the rating from -1 to 1 which indicates a specific agent's trust in another
given agent.  In this definition 0 represents no trust or distrust, positive values represent
trust and negative values represent distrust. Other papers recounted here refer to Marsh's
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general trust as reputation, i.e. the expectation of success in a future encounter with
another agent.
• Situational trust is the measure of how much trust will be conferred given a certain
situation.  Other models such as [1] refer to this as a “reputation context”, and this thesis
only examines single context situations in order to reduce complexity.
Trust is gained by knowledge, i.e. what one agent knows about another.  The knowledge that
agent x has about agent y is defined as Kx(y) and can be used to help x form a trust opinion
about y.  Knowledge may be boolean (i.e. x knows y or x does not know y) or it may be
represented in a way to describe partial knowledge.  Other authors refer to this as interaction
history.
Marsh also defines a notion of utility within his agent economy, where Ux(a) is the amount of
utility that agent x gains from situation a.  It is assumed that rational agents seek to maximize
utility, as in the real world.  Along with utility, Marsh distinguishes importance Ix(a) to
indicate the relative importance of situation a  to agent x.  Marsh maintains that this is
different than utility: for instance a lunch has a utility that may be measured in terms of
calories, but the importance of the lunch to a person is dependent on the last time they have
eaten.
Other aspects that Marsh elaborates on include the following:
• Competence: The level of experience that agent x has with agent y
• Group membership: An agent's level of trust towards agents from the same group
• Agent disposition: An agent's inclination towards cooperation
• Reciprocation: The modification of behavior based on a recent history of cooperation
It is apparent by now that Marsh's model is very complex and therefore is not considered
applicable in most real world scenarios.  Unfortunately his model displays difficulties at the
extreme values of -1 and 1 and also at 0, and struggles to rationalize the separate concepts of
distrust and trust.  And although the subject of hearsay information does appear, Marsh does
not incorporate the ability for agents to share information about each other. However, this
early work analyzing the application of reputation to autonomous agent networks is valuable
for the definitions presented and its comprehensive synthesis and application of economics,
sociology, and game theory to the area of trust models for intelligent agents.
5.1.2  Abdul-Rahman and Hailes
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes proposed in [1] that the concept of trust be extended to
incorporate input from surrounding agents.  They divide trust into two categories: direct trust
and recommender trust and provide an ad hoc algorithm for combining the two into a single
evaluation of trust between two agents for a given context.  This algorithm (referred to as
ARH) is recounted extensively below.
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5.1.3  Mui, Mohtashemi, and Halberstadt
Mui, Mohtashemi, and Halberstadt have proposed a computational model in [17] (referred to
later as MMH) which separates the concepts of trust and reputation into the following:
reputation is the “perception that an agent creates through past actions about its intentions
and norms” and trust is “a subjective expectation an agent has about another's future behavior
based on the history of their encounters.”  Mui, et. al. use a Bayesian approach to calculate
probabilities of an agent acting in one way or another and express reputation as a probability
of success ranging from 0 to 1. Mui does not examine effects of deception in this model, nor
is there any concept of what Marsh refers to as basic trust – the minimum probability of
success that an agent is willing to accept for an encounter.  This approach is recounted more
thoroughly below.
5.1.4  Yu and Singh
Yu and Singh have published extensively on the topic of reputation [23, 24, 25, 26].  Their
most recent approach applies Dempster-Shafer theory which has the advantage of explicitly
dealing with evidence in terms of pros and cons, and contains a construct for dealing with
uncertainty in an interaction.  
In Yu and Singh's model, a set of propositions  are defined such that ={T ,¬T }
Proposition T is the probability of success, ¬T is the probability of failure, and
{T ,¬T } represents the level of uncertainty.  Using Dempster-Shafer Theory, they define a
basic probability assignment (BPA) which is a function m such that
 m{T }m{¬T }m{T ,¬T }=1
Yu and Singh then define their belief function to be m and can use that to gauge the
trustworthiness of an agent in the community.  This is similar to Marsh's separate concepts of
trust and distrust, and like Marsh, Yu and Singh establish both lower and upper thresholds for
trust. Each agent also maintains a quality of service (QoS) metric 0≤s jk≤1 that equates  to
an agent j's rating of the last interaction with agent k.
Now in order to use Dempster-Shafer with a network of distributed agents, Yu and Singh




m1 X ⋅m2Y 
1− ∑
X ∩Y =∅
m1 X ⋅m2Y 
for all non empty X ,Y , A⊂   Thus, belief functions m1 and m2 can be combined into m
with m = m1 Å m2.  
An example of combining BPAs is given in Table 1.  Given two agents, each communicates a
reputation basic probability assignment, m1 and m2 respectively.  The first agent has a basic
probability assignment of 0.4 for success, 0.0 for failure, and 0.6 for uncertainty. The second
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Table 1: Combining Belief Functions in Dempster-Shafer Theory
For the specific set of propositions that Yu and Singh have laid out, we can apply the
orthogonal sum definition above to the three possible cases of belief and uncertainty:
m{T }=
m1{T }⋅m2{T }m1{T ,¬T }⋅m2{T }m1{T }⋅m2{T ,¬T }
1−m1{T }⋅m2{¬T }
m{¬T }=
m1{¬T }⋅m2{¬T }m1{T ,¬T }⋅m2{¬T }m1{¬T }⋅m2{T ,¬T }
1−m1{T }⋅m2{¬T }
m{T ,¬T }=
m1{T ,¬T }⋅m2{T ,¬T }
1−m1{T }⋅m2{¬T }
Upon combining these belief functions, we get the following results:
m({T}) =  0.04 + 0.36 + 0.06 = 0.46
m({¬T}) = 0
m({T, ¬T}) = 0.54
We interpret this to mean that, even though our expectation of failure is 0, we cannot
anticipate success since uncertainty has the highest resulting value (0.54). Thus, our
understanding of the evidence leads us to believe that the outcome is uncertain.
Like ARH and MMH, Yu and Singh distinguish between local history and the information
passed by other agents as references, and they construct a TrustNet of limited depth whereby
reputation information is compiled.   Some limitations to the model exist however: since
Dempter-Shafer calculations quickly become computationally intensive, the number of
neighbors and the depth of the referral chains must be restricted to small numbers.
Yu and Singh simulate environments with between 100 and 500 agents, limiting agents to 4
neighbors and the number of referrals to a depth of 6.  Yu and Singh define the system view
of an agent A's reputation to be the cumulative belief function of A's neighbors a1 ... ak so that
bA = ta1 Å ... Å tak where tai is the individual belief of agent ai.  This is then used to measure
the number of interactions required to “bootstrap” or initialize the system, and the
performance of the system when some nodes decide to abuse their high reputation.
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Additionally, they simulate the effect of grouping to allow the model to scale to large
numbers of agents.
In further work Yu and Singh go on to study the effects of deception in reputation systems
[25], and apply their reputation model to electronic commerce [24].
5.2  Simulated Models of Reputation
5.2.1  Sen and Sajja
Sen and Sajja [20] present a method for ensuring robustness of a reputation model that is
used to select processor resources.  This model is unlike others in that it uses service
selection as its measure of success instead of the frequently used Prisoner's Dilemma.  In this
model, an agent selects the service provider that has the highest reputation from a pool.  The
key innovation described in this system is the dynamic adjustment of the size of the selection
pool, and how it can be adjusted based on a threshold that guarantees success
probabilistically despite the existence of a set of liars within the population of agents.
Reputation is modeled using a reinforcement learning algorithm such that a reputation
estimate 0≤eij
t1≤1 represent an agents estimate of reputation at interaction t. It is
initialized at 0.5 and updated after every interaction using the following equations:
eij
t1=1−ieij
t i r t
eij
t1=1−oeij
t o r t
The first equation represents the estimate based on interactions and the second based on
observation.  i and o represent the learning rates assigned to direct interaction and
simple observation respectively, and it is given that io since they assume direct
interaction to be a more reliable measure of reputation.
Given a population of N user agents and P service providers, Sen and Sajja assume that
l≤N /2 of the population are liars (agents which always invert the ratings of the other
service agents).  The algorithm presented minimizes q (the size of the selection pool) such







P N −li  lq−i
Nq 
   ≥  g
This produces a selection pool size which will guarantee that the desired threshold of truthful
agents are queried when selecting service providers.  
The algorithm results in good performance when g is set to 0.95 and the number of liars in a
set of 40 agents remains at 16 or below.  Increases in the number of liars beyond this level
cause the performance of the entire system to quickly degrade.
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5.2.2  Morselli, Katz, and Bhattacharjee
Morselli et. al. [15] provide a game-theoretic framework for assessing the robustness of trust-
inference protocols, otherwise known as trust propagation protocols or reputation systems.
This framework is similar to the framework shown in this thesis in that it is intended for
objective comparison between reputation systems, was designed to be flexible enough to
accommodate a variety of reputation models, and focuses on distributed systems as opposed
to those reputation systems which require a trusted, centralized authority.
The framework which Morselli et. al. describe defines the following characteristics:
• Each agent in the framework is known by its pseudonym. Pseudonyms are distinct, easy to
generate by the agent themselves, and impossible to impersonate.  It is assumed that these
characteristics would be provided by using public key cryptography.
• The adversary is assumed to have almost complete control over the system.  Adversaries
are not allowed to interfere with transactions between honest agents, however, they are
able to mount coalition attacks (attacks that cooperate with other malicious agents) and
Sybil attacks (attacks that allow the adversary to simulate the actions of multiple agents).
Likewise, adversaries might lie when it comes time to report reputation information to the
rest of the society.
• Agents participate in simultaneous two party games which are modeled after Prisoner's
Dilemma [5], with scores assigned as in Table 2.  For more background on Prisoner's




Table 2: Prisoner's Dilemma Score Table
The work presented in [15] differs from this work in that it requires the agents to broadcast
reputation information to each other in order to report reputation information to neighbors.
Also, their simulation is modeled after repeated, simultaneous Prisoner's Dilemma, and their
focus is more on robustness than on performance of the protocols examined.
5.3  Applied Models of Reputation
5.3.1  NICE
Lee, Sherwood, and Bhattacharjee present a distributed scheme for representing trust called
NICE in [13] which is intended to apply to a variety of applications which include media
streaming, multiparty conferencing, and other peer-to-peer applications. 
NICE applications use must provide local resources in order to gain access to remote
resources. Transactions in NICE are represented by secure exchange of certificates which can
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then be used to acquire resources in the future. Each agent is identified using a PGP style
identifier along with a public key.  In that way impersonation is eliminated and the only
remaining difficulty is the ability to generate a new identity.  Lee, et. al. define non-
cooperative agents as those which attempt to get “free” resources by issuing cookies (digital
certificates) that they do not intend to redeem.  The goal of the system is to identify those
non-cooperative agents to avoid being cheated.
Trust is defined in terms of a directed trust graph A0  A1 ... An on T, where edge
values are weighted based on how much node Ai trusts node Ai+1.   Agent A's trust of agent B
is denoted as 0.0≤T AB≤1.0 .  If TA(B) > TB(A), then A will only barter with B if B offers
more resources than it gets in return.  These resources are represented with cookies that are
valued on a scale from 0 to 1.  If A wants to infer a trust value for B, it will choose the
strongest path along T which exists between A and B and select the minimum trust value
along that path.  This path can be easily calculated using depth-first search.
Lee et. al. show results that indicate that the NICE system is scalable, because the average
number of nodes visited remains relatively constant even as system size increases.  However,
the success ratio and number of nodes visited vary proportionally depending on how many
cookies are stored and the degree of neighbors which each node has. 
This work is notable for the fact that population sizes up to 2048 nodes were used.
Additionally, Lee et.al. show that cooperative agents can establish cooperative groups despite
the fact that there may be a large percentage of non-cooperating agents in the environment.  
5.3.2  Kamvar, Schlosser, and Garcia-Molina (EigenRep)
EigenRep [12] is a reputation system which makes use of matrices of reputation information
which are maintained and stored by agents in their system.  The authors explicitly target their
system at providing reputation for peer-to-peer systems where malicious peers can generate
illegitimate files for sharing and the general population of peers have no way of
distinguishing illegitimate files from the legitimate ones.
Kamvar et. al. describe the following design considerations that are relevant to each of the
reputation systems recounted here:
• The system should be self-policing
• The system should maintain anonymity
• The system should not assign any profit to newcomers
• The system should have minimal overhead
• The system should be robust in the face of malicious collectives of agents
As an estimate of trustworthiness, each agent i rates its peer agent j with the formula
sij=sat i , j −unsat i , j  -- the difference between the number of satisfactory interactions
i has had with j and the unsatisfactory interactions.  Each agent maintains a matrix C of
normalized local reputation values such that C is comprised of elements cij where






cij is the normalized reputation that agent i has assigned to agent j. This method ensures that
the reputation matrix is protected against exaggeration and deception because each of agent
i's ratings are weighted in terms of the other ratings that agent i has provided.
The reputation system is then applied to simulations of Gnutella file distributions.  They
conclude that their model is able to bound downloads of illegitimate files despite populations
of malicious peers that are as high as 70%.
5.3.3  Aberer and Despotovic
Aberer and Despotovic describe a reputation system for Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems in [2]
which is intended to meet needs that are left unfulfilled by other reputation systems:
scalability to large numbers of nodes, and reduced amounts of required data storage and
network communications.  In order to meet these goals, they consider the problem in three
dimensions: 
• Global trust model: how may an agent be described as trustworthy?
• Local algorithm to determine trust: how may an agent locally approximate the global
reality of the trust system?
• Data and communications management: how is the data distributed and stored and what
kinds of communications must take place in order for the trust model to work?
In order to reduce the amount of data stored and communicated, the model works on a binary
rating system – an agent is either considered trustworthy or not.  The only data that is
exchanged is then reduced to complaints about an agent registered by other agents which
have interacted with it. So a complaint c(q,p) is a complaint registered by q about agent p,
and an assessment of p's trustworthiness, T(p), is constructed with the following:
T  p=∣c  p ,q∣×∣c q , p∣
A high value of T(p) is an indication that agent p can not be trusted.
Complaint data is stored in a distributed data format called a P-Grid [3], which is essentially
a distributed binary search tree as in the figure below.  At the leaf level of the tree, agents
store complaints about and by a certain agent.  Agents are mapped into the tree structure
based on their agent identifier (an integer).  In this way, given n agents, comprehensive
complaint information about an agent can be obtained in O(log(n)) time, and each agent need
only store O(log(n)) complaint data.  This means that this trust model promises to scale well
over large numbers of agents.  Figure 2 shows an example P-Grid for n=8 agents.
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Figure 2: Example P-Grid
Now, this model has the disadvantage that one agent, say agent a, carries the entire data set
for another, say agent b.  If agent a is malicious, agent b's reputation is ruined forever.  So
Aberer and Despotovic define a threshold pmax for the probability of malicious behavior in the
system, and use that threshold to decide how many replicas need to be instantiated to ensure
that one agent can not thwart the whole system.
Aberer and Despotovic perform simulations on their model and find that it is robust against
“cheater agents,” i.e. agents which complain about other agents who have not wronged them
with a constant probability.  They find their model somewhat less robust against like
populations of cheater agents who complain with a variable probability.
6 Implemented Reputation Systems
6.1  Abdul-Rahman and Hailes Reputation Model
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [1] have proposed a reputation model which draws in part from
prior work defining trust in a computational manner [14].  Their main objective is to allow
trust decisions based on a variable scale, not the binary decision usually employed by
cryptographers, but more a subjective degree of belief by which agents make choices.  
Their working definition of reputation relies on the experiences of the agent themselves, part
of which may be information gathered from other agents.  This allows them to generalize
reputation information from the agent and also the agents neighbors.
In their definition, an experience is either information gathered in a personal experience or
reliance on a recommendation from another agent.    The first is known as direct trust while
the second is referred to as recommender trust.  Direct trust is associated with agent’s name,
a context, and a degree of trust, which is defined as one of the following: Very Trustworthy,
Trustworthy, Untrustworthy, or Very Untrustworthy.  Evaluation of recommender
information is defined in a similar way.
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Figure 3: Abdul-Rahman and Hailes’ Trust Model
The agent then is able to keep a set Q of 4-tuples of information related to their own
experiences, where Q is a set of cross products of contexts, agents, and subjective reputation
ratings.  Likewise, the agent keeps a set R of information related to recommenders. The
algorithm allows the agent to keep adjustment values on recommenders which do not see the
world as they do (i.e. the recommender’s “very trustworthy” is only a “trustworthy” to the
agent).  This set R consists of cross products of contexts, agents, and adjusted
recommendation information.  Information from Q and R are combined using a statistical
formula, and a single evaluation of trust is obtained.
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes account for a number of the design concerns associated with
reputation systems.  They provide for context, they consider that not all recommender
information will be reliable, so they allow adjustments when evaluating it.  Also, they allow a
means of bootstrapping new agents into the network, by providing them with a number of
pre-trusted entities to provide them with recommender information as they build their own
set of experiences.
6.2  Mui, Mohtashemi, and Halberstadt’s Reputation Model
Mui, Mohtashemi, and Halberstadt [16, 17] provide a rather different notion of reputation
than ARH.  Their idea is based on the concept of reciprocity and its role in cooperation as
described by social scientists.  Additionally, they differentiate between trust and reputation,
since reputation is one measure whereby trust can be gained, i.e. a good reputation is not
always sufficient to inspire trust. The following diagram depicts the relationship that Mui
et.al. see between reputation, trust, and reciprocity.
Figure 4: Relationships between Reputation, Trust, and Reciprocity
The following definitions are given in the paper for these three concepts:
• Reciprocity: mutual exchange of deeds (such as favor or revenge)
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• Reputation: perception that an agent creates through past actions about its intentions
or norms.
• Trust: a subjective expectation an agent has about another’s future behavior based on
the history of their encounters.
Mathematically, this system is represented using Bayesian probability theory. Each agent
keeps track of a set of encounters, along with their results. Reputation is a probability
measure from 0 to 1 on the likelihood of another agent to reciprocate.  Reputation scores are
kept for each pair of agents in the model.  Observed encounters count equally with
experienced encounters, and are kept in the same set of encounter data. 
Trust, ab , is defined as an agent a's expectation for reciprocation by a particular agent b in
a given context.  Agent a uses its encounter history with agent b to calculate a reputation
ab using a Beta prior distribution. This process is as follows:
The encounter history Dab is the set of individual encounters {xab(1), xab(2), ...,xab(n)}.
The prior probability uses a Beta distribution function, p  =Beta c1 , c2 where c1 and
c2 are parameters determined by prior assumptions such that 0≤c1≤1  and 0≤c2≤1 . An




Assuming that the probability of successful encounters is independent, the likelihood of p
cooperations in n attempts (probability of cooperation) can be modeled as
 LDab | =
p1−n - p
After combining the prior and the likelihood, we get a posterior estimate of 
p   | Dab=Beta c1 p , c2n− p
Trust ab is defined as the probability of cooperation on encounter n+1, or the probability
that xabn1=1 .  This means that at a's next encounter with b, agent a will estimate the
probability of cooperation from agent b to be
ab= p xabn1=1| Dab=
c1 p
c1c2n
Mui’s model accounts for different levels of confidence, however, it does not differentiate
between observed encounters and real encounters, assuming that all observations are first
hand and not transferred by “word of mouth.” For the case in which two unknown agents do
not have any encounter history, Mui chooses a uniform distribution with c1=1 and c2=1, so
that ab=0.5 initially.
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7 Simulation Framework
The objective of the thesis is to implement the ARH and MMH reputation systems, simulate
their behavior in a variety of circumstances, and create metrics that can be used to compare
the performance of these models.  This section identifies the issues in developing a suitable
simulation framework and formally defines that framework and its accompanying metrics.
7.1  Issues
The intuitive notions of reputation can be translated into reputation models for network
systems.  A subset of design issues surrounding these models include the following:
• Will the system store reputation in a central repository or in a distributed database?
• How will reputations be calculated?
• What constitutes positive behavior or negative behavior?
• Is there a concept of redemption once an agent has gained a bad reputation?
• Can we prevent or discourage agents from changing their identity to wipe their bad
reputation clean?
• How will the reputation system combat deception?
• How long does the system take to reliably identify disreputable agents?
• What is the performance of requests for reputation information?
Depending on the application, trade offs may be made with these design decisions. One of the
advantages of the reputation system is that since it is greatly automated, one can simulate the
dynamics of this model as it would be deployed in the real world.  Additionally, measuring
the model’s security can be done by comparing the results of individual queries (e.g. “Is agent
X trustworthy?”) to global knowledge about agent X. The model also has the advantage of
years of research from other disciplines such as economics, game theory, and statistics.
7.2  Design Goals
The goals of the test framework are as follows:
• Simplicity: The framework must be simple in that the results should be easily
explainable. Simplicity also promotes an objective evaluation and comparison of the
reputation models.
• Realism: The framework should model real world scenarios as much as possible,
without compromising the simplicity of the system.
• Measurable: Because this is a distributed system, information is spread throughout a
network of independent agents.  However the test framework must be able to
measure the entire system's results.
• Re-usable: The framework's design should be generic enough to allow it to be re-
used for simulation of other reputation models.
7.3  Characteristics
The results of empirical comparison of reputation models largely depend on the framework
that is used to test the models.  If the comparison was to be done given a certain context or
application, the test framework should model that application.  For instance, we would
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assume that in order to compare reputation data for the purpose of spam filtering, one would
create a framework similar to what a spam filter would need to do and feed the framework
real world data if at all possible.  
However, in this case we are taking a more generic approach, so we must design the
framework in terms of characteristics which have a real world analog.  So, if we assume that
spam filters recognize that it is unlikely that spam is generated from your local domain, then
a simulation framework must have a concept of a group which can influence the reputation
results.
The following things have been outlined as worthwhile characteristics to emulate with the
framework:
• World size: Ability to measure performance depending on the number of agents in
the virtual world.
• Groups: The ability to group agents in order to allow cooperation.
• Agent Strategies: The results of various strategies should be comparable.  By
strategy we mean the way an agent behaves in the simulation.
• Deception: The ability to inject deceptive agents into the simulation to see what the
impact is on the level of success.
• Agent-to-agent interactions: Clearly an agent in a distributed reputation model
which requests information from neighbors is likely to get a better picture of
reputation than one which does not request information.
• Level of hearsay evidence: Models will perform differently depending on the
amount of information that has been incorporated by hearsay (i.e. indirect experience
reported by neighbors) versus individual experience.
• Level of Trust: The ability to vary the degree to which an agent will “step out in
faith” given a limited amount of experience.
7.4  Protocol
Reputation and trust potentially involves many different variables.  In order to simplify
simulations and their analysis, researchers have historically turned to game theory to create
simple tests of success and failure for their reputation models [e.g. 14, 17, 23,  15], and in
particular they have used Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma [5].  The framework presented here
creates a different binary game which we refer to as The Resource Game which is described
below, but first we will review Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.
7.4.1  Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma [5] is a hypothetical situation where two criminals are arrested and
put into separate jail cells.  The authorities want each prisoner to testify against the other.
The dilemma is that if a prisoner cooperates with their partner in crime and says nothing, they
are rewarded with a shorter sentence.  If the prisoners both defect and try to incriminate the
other, they are in a neutral position.  If Prisoner A cooperates and keeps quiet, while Prisoner
B defects, then this is a bad situation for A, and a very good situation for B since he will
receive a shorter sentence in return for his testimony.  The following payoff matrix describes
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the outcomes of one iteration of Prisoner's Dilemma (the rows are Prisoner A's actions while




Table 3: Scoring for Prisoner's Dilemma
Points are assigned to score each interaction such that a > b > c > d.  Prisoner’s Dilemma is a
simple model which describes both the benefit and pain associated with trust and betrayal.
Prisoner's dilemma is not without it's critics, however.  Marsh quotes Argyle [4] as
identifying the following differences between Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and real life
experience:
1. Play is simultaneous, which means that each player is required to make a move.  In the
real world a player can “go home” or not play at all, in which case their score would be an
even 0. Since the concept of trust is of primary concern to our study, distrust should be
punished by lack of opportunity as it is in the real world, and not rewarded as it is in PD.
2. The game is too abstract.  A valid concern, but one that is generally overlooked in the
generic analysis of reputation models.
3. The prisoner's dilemma assumes no communication.  However communication increases
cooperation, and is certainly characteristic of reality.  Reputation models seek to use
communication to eliminate uncertainty and increase cooperation.
4. The players are strangers to each other.  In real life there may exist some prior
experiences which will inform behavior. The point of reputation systems is to collect
experience and use it to inform behavior, and this runs counter to the assumptions that go
into PD.
5. Social norms are absent. While automated societies may not have social norms as we
think of them humanly, they should bear some resemblance to the norms of the human
society which they support.  So, for instance, although it is very possible to create
malicious ActiveX controls and present them on the Internet for widespread consumption,
only a small percentage of actual ActiveX controls found on the Internet are malicious.
This is because of the real life consequences of anti-social behavior that exist outside of
the game.
To these criticisms, we will add one more.  Prisoner's Dilemma assumes that both players
have opportunities in the interaction to lose in an equivalent fashion. For instance, if Party A
transacts business through Party B's e-commerce site, and Party B does not fulfill the order,
Party A is out the amount of money spent, and Party B has acquired the money along with a
non-tangible loss reputation.  However, in Internet transactions, often one party has nothing
to lose except for its reputation, and this loss is not necessarily comparable to the real loss
experienced by the other party.  In a peer-to-peer network, there is no tangible loss to a user
who spreads a virus which masquerades as a legitimate file.  The only loss occurs to the
unfortunate user who acquires the virus.
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7.4.2  The Resource Game
In ordert to counter these shortcomings, our simulation framework is built upon a simple
repeated game that reflects a model for resource distribution.  Prisoner's Dilemma relies on
the idea that the two players are helplessly thrown into the dilemma with each other, which is
again, not a reflection of how transactions take place in the real world.  The natural use of
reputation in a resource-oriented model would be to select a resource provider from a pool of
candidates, and not use reputation to inform the strategy to be taken once a candidate is
selected for you.  In the first scenario, agents are free to use principles of reciprocity to guide
way suppliers are selected.
In order to work around the shortcomings of PD, the simulation framework was built on the
following game of binary outcomes.  In any given encounter there is an customer agent and a
supplier agent.  All agents have the capability to be both customers and suppliers.  Each
customer desires a particular kind of resource and must find a supplier which can supply that
resource. For any given turn, the customer randomly selects c choices which could potentially
supply the desired resource and requests reputation information from r referrers.  Then the
customer uses its reputation model to assess the reputation information and select the
supplier which it believes is most likely to provide a successful response.  Once the customer
initiates an encounter, the supplier responds in one of two ways, either with success or
failure, based on a pre-defined strategy. Once the encounter is over and the results are known,
the information is assimilated into the customer's local reputation information which will
then be available to inform the next interaction or query from another agent.
The object of the game, like Prisoner's Dilemma, is to maximize success while minimizing
failure.  The following payoff matrix is assumed (the rows are the customer's actions while
the columns are the supplier's choices):
Success Failure
Interaction +1,0 -1,0
No Interaction 0,0 0,0
Table 4: Scoring for the Resource Game 
Thus, an agent's score for the game can be calculated from successes – failures.  The game is
not zero-sum, but rather assumes that each agent has unlimited resources to give.  Also, all
moves in the game happen sequentially – in other words the results of encounter n are
available to inform choices in encounter n+1.
7.4.3  Formal Specification of Simulation Environment
Assume that the simulated environment is made up of N agents.  This environment is
designated as a world W and consists of a set of agents ai so that W = {a1, a2, ..., aN}.   Each
agent ai is assigned a resource which it can provide from a set of resources R = {r1, r2, ...,
rmax}, where rmax is the total number of resources.
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We will use the symbol E to refer to encounters which are numbered globally throughout W.
The encounters between agents are numbered globally such that 0≤e≤Emax
Each encounter is numbered globally such that encounter Ej represents the jth global
interaction with 0≤ j≤Emax  The order of encounters between the agents in this world is
scripted according to a simulation script S, which defines Emax encounters for agents that exist
in world W. For each encounter, script S pre-determines the customer agent and the resource
that agent will be requesting:
 S {{ae , re} | ae∈W ,re∈R ,∀ 0≤e≤Emax}  
Since individual agents have no visibility to the global situation, we will use the notation
ek
a  to represent the number of encounters agent a has had where agent a∈W and
0≤k≤emax
a  We define emax
a as the maximum number of encounters agent a will have
during simulation script S.
Each recorded interaction I between agents consists of a customer agent, a supplier agent, a
resource exchanged, the result of the interaction, and the encounter number.  The result t of
the interaction, is one of the discrete values of set T = {SUCCESS, FAILURE,
NO_INTERACTION}.  So formally, 
I {{c , s , r , t , e} | c , s∈W , r∈R , t∈T , and 0≤e≤Emax}
Each agent a  maintains its own history of interactions known as Ha, such that
H a {I k  | 1≤k≤eE j
a } where eE j
a is the number of interactions agent a has had by the jth
global encounter.  If agent a elects to set a window size eE j
a for its history, the history
then becomes a set H a ' {I k  | eE j
a −≤k≤eE j
a }
In order to calculate reputation b
a  -- the reputation of agent b from agent a's perspective,
we assume the reputation system defines a function f such that b
a= f b , H a where
a ,b∈W   Reputation  is not assumed to be numeric, but it must be a set of ordered
values and be comparable.  The reputation system must also define minimums and
maximums such that min≤≤max holds.
Trust level  is a value such that min≤≤max which signifies the minimum level of
reputation an agent is willing to accept prior to initiating an interaction with another agent.
7.4.4  Formal Specification of Metrics 
In order to evaluate reputation systems against one another, it is necessary to define some
standard metrics that will work no matter how the reputation system operates.  Below we
define some of these generic metrics.  
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7.4.4.1  Average Reputation 
Average reputation is useful in seeing how the system as a whole is categorizing agents with









Accuracy is the percentage of successful predictions of behavior.  Given a well-defined
population of agents and a standard number of interactions between agents, accuracy is the
level of success that is achieved across the simulation environment.
The level of success a for an individual agent a is the sum of the interactions which agent
a has recorded that resulted in successes.  Correspondingly, agent a's level of failure a is
the sum of the failures, and agent a's level of non-interaction a is the sum of the
interactions that did not occur (i.e. were recorded as NO_INTERACTION).
The total level of success  for agents in simulation S is =∑ a   Also, the resulting
score of a particular agent can be calculated as a=a−a and the total score of a set of
agents in simulation S is =∑ a  | a∈W
7.4.4.3  Performance
Because the agent interactions are governed by a random distribution and a constant number
of interactions and information transfers between agents, performance of the reputation
system is solely dependent on how an agent's reputation information is updated (or learned)
from the encounters they experience and the referral information they collect.  Thus the
performance metric equates to a “rate of learning or unlearning.”
For performance we set a target success value (e.g. 90% success) for the system and the
performance of the reputation system is the number of system wide encounters required
before the system reaches that target success value.  So, more formally, performance
target  is the minimum value of j, such that 0≤ j≤Emax and ≥target
7.4.4.4  Resistance to Deception
Resistance to Deception evaluates the accuracy and performance of the reputation system
when certain agents are introduced which practice deception.  This is described as the
difference between system-wide level of success  and system-wide score  with and
without deception.
7.5  Implementation
The reputation simulation framework is implemented using Sun's Java SDK 1.5.  In order to
balance the need for flexibility in the model with the generality desired, reputation models are
implemented on top of abstract classes.  Agents for a given trust model are implemented as
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subclasses of an abstract ReputationAgent class that defines the basic communications
between agents.  These agents exist in a class World and are manipulated into interactions
with each other through the class Simulation.  
Each simulation is based on a set of steps defined in a simulation script.  The interactions
defined in the simulation script sequentially direct which customer agent will request which
resource.  The simulation script is determined by choosing customer agents randomly with an
even distribution from the simulated population.  Also, the resource which the agent will
request is assigned randomly from the pool of resources.  Functions such as communication
and propagation of reputation information are as common as possible.  Also, metric
evaluation is done in a common way, but calculation of reputation information is model
specific, as is evaluation of trust.
The following terms are defined to describe the simulation framework:
• World: This is the simulation's environment.  It contains agents, resources, and the
means for selecting.
• Agent: These are the independent actors (both suppliers and customers) in The
Resource Game. They exchange reputation information and interact according to a
prescribed strategy.
• Resources: Each agent has a resource to offer in unlimited supply.  Collecting
resources successfully is the object of The Resource Game.
• Script: The script dictates which agent will be searching for which resource and in
what sequence.  The choice of agent and resource is randomly determined in an even
distribution across the population of agents and the pool of resources.
• Interaction: This is the historical record of one turn at the resource game, and record
the customer, supplier, the resource requested and the results of the interaction. We use
the term encounter interchangeably with interaction.
• Reputation: This is a referrer agent's estimate of the likelihood of success of a future
interaction with a given supplier agent.
• Trust Level: The level of risk that a customer agent is willing to entertain in order to
fulfill its desire for acquiring the resource.  Or, in other words, the minimum
reputation that a supplier must have in order to be considered for an interaction.
7.5.1  Simulation of Agents
Agents are simulated as Java objects who interact with each other based on the instructions of
the simulation script.  Agents only have visibility to their own experiences and are able to
request reputation information from other agents.  They have no way of knowing whether this
referrer-provided reputation information is based in fact, but can use it to establish their own
evaluations of particular agents. While some simulation models have created graphs to show
interrelationships between agents, this model avoids that approach because of the observation
that the real world is much more dynamic and that computers on the Internet have a high
degree of interconnectivity, and not just a small number of neighbors as some models
simulate. Since agents do have full insight into their own experiences, they can use this
information to make trust decisions. 
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Each agent has a defined persona or strategy which directs its actions throughout the
simulation.  Agents are initialized with a primary strategy and a secondary strategy that are
one of GOOD, BAD, or RANDOM.  When a customer agent interacts with a supplier with
the GOOD strategy the encounter always results in success.  Likewise, BAD strategies
generate failures for the encounter, and supplier agents with a RANDOM strategy will
respond with success with a probability of 0.5.  The primary strategy is used initially until a
defined threshold WAIT_MOVES is reached.  At that point the secondary strategy takes
over.  Because of the infinite possibilities of mixing agent strategies, a vital few scenarios are
chosen which illustrate the effects of increasing deception in the agent network.
7.5.2  Simulation Protocol
The following diagram shows the protocol for communication in this model.  First the
customer agent (Agent A below) begins with a pickPreferred(resource), which in turn
randomly chooses c choices from the World which provide the requested resource.  Then the
agent randomly chooses r referrers from the World of agents.  The customer requests
reputation information from each referrer for each of the c choices with vouchFor(agent).
Then, the encounter is made by the customer calling the supplier agent's interact() function.
Lastly the results are used to update the customer's history and reputation information using
addHistory(interaction).
Figure 5: Simulation Protocol with One Choice and One Referrer
The protocol is intentionally simplistic to enable an accurate accounting of all of the
reputation models and their behavior.  Since each encounter requires a constant number of
network requests, it allows us to focus analysis the mathematical representation of reputation
itself, not the limitations or advantages of the network protocol that may be paired with that
reputation system.  
Another possible approach would be to allow variations in the amount of communications
allowed between agents.  Also, the protocol could be extended by allowing chained referrals
as some models have done [17, 23].  These would both be a worthy areas for future work.














Result: (SUCCESS or FAILURE)
addHistory(interaction)
vouchFor(c)
7.5.3  Simulation Variables
There are potentially a large number of variables that could be introduced into simulations of
reputation.  The intention of the simulations is to bound these variables in a reasonable way
so that the impact of changes in the environment or the way reputations were calculated could
be easily seen and applied in order to make improvements of the model for a given
application. 
The following table summarizes the key parameters used in simulations:
Parameter Description
WORLD_SIZE The number of agents with which the simulated world is populated
SCRIPT_LENGTH The total (global) number of encounters to be simulated in a given
script
NUM_RESOURCES The number of resources to make available in the simulated world
MAX_GROUP_RATIO Used to determine the level of grouping in the simulated world.
The number of groups G is calculated by G=N/(NGr) where N is
the world size and Gr is MAX_GROUP_RATIO.  This
functionality is disabled by default.
BAD_GUY_RATIO Varied between 0 and 1 and is used to populate the world with a
given percentage of agents with a BAD strategy.  Similar ratios
exist for other defined strategies, and any agents that are not
included in the total of these ratios are assigned the default GOOD
strategy.
RANDOM_GUY_RATIO Varied between 0 and 1 and is used to populate the world with a
given percentage of agents with a RANDOM strategy. 
GOOD_BAD_GUY_RATIO Varied between 0 and 1 and is used to populate the world with a
given percentage of agents with a GOOD_BAD strategy (primary
strategy is GOOD but turns to BAD at a given interval). 
BAD_GOOD_GUY_RATIO Varied between 0 and 1 and is used to populate the world with a
given percentage of agents with a BAD_GOOD strategy (primary
strategy is BAD but turns to GOOD at a given interval). 
DECEPTIVE_RATIO Varies between 0 and 1 to determine what ratio of the world will
exercise deception when reporting reputation information.
TARGET_RATIO The ratio of the simulated population which are targets of
deception.  By default, GOOD agents will be assigned as targets
first, followed by agents with RANDOM and BAD strategies.
DECEPT_TYPE Deception Type.  0 = No Deception, 1=Complement,
2=Exaggerated Positive, 3=Exaggerated Negative
EXAG_REP A coefficient of exaggeration for reputation values
EXAG_EXP A coefficient of exaggeration for experience values
NUM_CHOICES The maximum number of supplier agents that a customer will
consider for any given interaction
NUM_REFERRALS The maximum number of references a customer agent will seek for
any given interaction
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Parameter Description
REPORT_GRANULARITY This dictates how many global interactions take place between
report summaries (of total system successes, failures, average
reputation by strategy, etc...)
REPORT_WINDOW_SIZE This adjusts the level of smoothing applied to the reported results,
allowing for easier comparison between simulations.
WAIT_MOVES The number of individual agent encounters prior to a change in
strategy (to the secondary strategy for instance).
OSCILLATE Boolean value.  If true, all agents will oscillate between their
primary and secondary strategies.
TRUST_THRESHOLD A constant value that corresponds to the rate of change above
which an agent will become “shy”
TRUST_HISTORY The number of encounters an individual agent remembers and
applies to its calculation of trust level.
TRUST_MODEL Selects the type of decay function that will be used for trust level
management.  0= No TLM, 1=Linear, 2=Squared, 3=SQRT
TRUST_TRIGGER Selects the type of trigger function that will be used for trust level
management. 0= No TLM, 10=EQN10, 11=EQN11, 12=EQN13.
TRUST_DECAY The number of encounters an agent delays before returning its trust
level to the minimum value.
REP_WINDOW_SIZE The number of individual encounters that an agent remembers for
recalculating reputations over time (Experience Window).
REP_WINDOW Binary switch to turn on the use of the Experience Window
(values of true or false).
REP_RECALC The number of individual interactions that must reached prior to
sliding the Experience Window forward and recalculating an
agents reputation information.
REP_WINDOW Boolean value. “true” turns on experience windows and “false”
turns them off.
HEARSAY Only applicable to the MMH model, but the fraction at which
reference reputations are incorporated into the prior probability of
success with a given supplier agent.  
TRUST_FLOOR A constant which dictates a system-wide minimum acceptable
reputation.
MMH_THRESHOLD A variable defined in MMH which indicates how referrals should
be weighted for inclusion into the prior probability based on the
amount of experience that a reference claims.
MMH_UPDATE A variable to direct how frequently (in terms of individual agent
encounters) MMH agents should adjust their prior probabilities.
Table 5: Simulation Parameters
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8 Initial Results
8.1  Description
Initial experimentation was conducted in order to get a feel for how the simulation
framework works.  First, we want to compare performance of reputation systems using some
simple simulation parameters so that we can understand how the simulation environment
effects the success of the reputation system to predict behavior.  Also, there are a number of
simulation parameters that we have discussed which may have impacts on the overall results,
so it is necessary to understand those impacts.  The following test cases were defined and run
in the simulation environment:
1. Ratio of Good to Bad Agents
2. Random Agents
3. Effects of Varying Hearsay
4. Effects of Varying World Size
5. Effects of Varying Number of Choices
6. Effects of Varying Number of References
7. Reversing Learned Behavior
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8.2  Test Cases
8.2.1  Test Case: Ratio of Good to Bad Agents
8.2.1.1  Description
In this test case we construct a simple scenario with agents that have two fundamentally
different strategies.  The GOOD agents always respond to an interaction with a SUCCESS
and the BAD agents always respond with a FAILURE.  The assumption is that after a
learning phase, the reputation model will be able to distinguish GOOD agents from BAD.
Relevant questions include: How many encounters will be required to achieve a certain
percentage of successful interactions?  How does the total number of successes possible in a
given number of encounters vary depending on the percentage of BAD agents?
It should be noted that there is a theoretical upper bound to the amount of success the system
has depending on the percentage of BAD agents.  Since we restrict the number of choices that
a customer agent can select from, and those choices are selected at random in an even
distribution, then the probability of selecting at least one GOOD agent in an encounter is
max=P good agents≥1=1−R b 
c
where Rb is the percentage of BAD agents, and c is the number of choices to select from.  So,
for Rb=0.1 and c=5, customer agents will have at least one GOOD agent to choose from
approximately 99.999% of the time.  However, for Rb = 0.8, this value would drop to 67.2%
and for Rb = 0.9 it drops further to approximately 41%.  An ideal reputation system would
therefore be able to perform at a level equal to max  We will compare our reputation
systems to this ideal in the experiment below.
8.2.1.2  Results for MMH Model
Both GOOD and BAD agents begin with a reputation of 0.5 (equivalent to a 50% probability
of success).  Good agents are very quickly sorted from the BAD agents, and it is interesting to
note that no matter what the level of BAD agents, the system reaches max within
approximately 6000 encounters.  
36 A Comparison of Reputation-based Trust Systems        4/29/2005


































Figure 6: MMH Model with Varied Number of Bad Agents
8.2.1.3  Results for ARH Model
We have arbitrarily set both GOOD and BAD agents to begin with a default rating of 2
(equivalent to Good) in the ARH Model. Good agents quickly rise to 3 (Very Good) rating,
while BAD agents quickly drop to a 0 (Very Bad) rating.  As the percentage of BAD agents
increases, the eventual percentage of successes that ARH can achieve is limited by max
as described above.  ARH reaches this level at different times depending on what the
percentage of BAD agents is.  So, for instance, it takes approximately 10,000 encounters for
90% Bad Agents to reach max , while it takes as many as 16,000 encounters for 70%
BAD agents to reach max .  Additionally, when we consider the case with 10% BAD
agents, it appears that max has not been reached even at the end of the 30,000 encounters
simulated.  At the 30,000th encounter, MMH is reporting 100% success, while ARH is still
reporting 99.8% success.  This indicates that ARH may not be suitable for applications which
have expectations for a low number of malicious agents, but require tight margins of error.
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Figure 7: ARH Model with Varied Number of Bad Agents
8.2.1.4  Discussion
Separating GOOD from BAD agents is a key test because the rate in which a reputation
system can distinguish good behavior from bad behavior will limit its suitability for certain
applications.  MMH is very sensitive to successful interactions, quickly sorting the GOOD
agents from the BAD agents.  It is therefore probable that MMH would work well
maintaining tight margins of error in an environment with only a few hostile agents.  ARH,
on the other hand, takes a long time to reach max and this means that it is likely to have a
greater margin of error, at least initially when the system is still learning.
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8.2.2  Test Case: Performance of Random Agents
8.2.2.1  Description
Theoretically, agents which respond randomly to interaction requests (i.e. respond with a
SUCCESS or FAILURE each with 50% probability) should receive an average reputation
Prandom that reflects this 50/50 chance of success.  The population of this test is comprised
of one third GOOD agents, one third BAD agents, and one third RANDOM agents.  After a
given number of encounters, the average reputations of the RANDOM agents will be
compared with their theoretical values.
8.2.2.2  Results for MMH Model
MMH regards reputation as a degree of probability for success, and so agents which deliver
success with 50% probability should have an average reputation rating of 0.5, i.e.
PRANDOM=0.5 .  We find that after 30,000 encounters, the average reputation of a
RANDOM agent is 0.5 just as expected.  The reputation of GOOD agents rises much more
steeply than BAD agents decreases. This is due to the fact that GOOD agents quickly begin to
have more interactions than BAD agents and thus increase reputation faster.  When the
number of choices in the game is reduced from 5 to 1, the rise and fall of GOOD and BAD
agents happens evenly.



























Figure 8:  Average Reputation for MMH with Good/Bad/Random Strategies 
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8.2.2.3  Results for ARH Model
Although ARH reputations are discrete numbers, since we are using a 0 .. 3 sliding scale to
represent ARH “Very Untrustworthy”, “Untrustworthy”, “Trustworthy”, and “Very
Trustworthy”, the half-way point between Good and Bad reputations can be represented by
1.5.  While there is no mathematical basis on which to presume that results for ARH would
be similar to MMH, one might guess that in this scale of 0.0 - 3.0 Prandom would approach
a value of 1.5.  However in practice the average rating converges to 0.95 after 30,000
encounters. One could read this result as indicating that the ARH model interprets a 50/50
chance of success as “Untrustworthy,” but there is every indication that this value would
continue to decrease with more encounters.
ARH Good/Bad/Random Strategies - Average Reputation





















Figure 9:  Average Reputation for ARH with Good/Bad/Random Strategies
8.2.2.4  Discussion
Average reputation is not that relevant to actual performance, but it does give some indication
of what a reputation means.  For MMH, reputation is a probability, and this is evident from
its results.  For ARH, reputation seems more comparative than absolute. RANDOM agents
are not consistent in their responses, so their reputations are continually decreasing, just as a
consistently BAD agent would have a continually decreasing reputation.
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8.2.3  Test Case: Effects of Hearsay Evidence
8.2.3.1  Description
Hearsay evidence is evidence which an agent incorporates into its reputation history which it
then uses itself to make judgments or would pass on to others.  The danger of hearsay
evidence is that it could lead to rumors, in other words inaccurate information could be
passed to other agents and poison the entire system's reputation information.  On the other
hand, hearsay allows agents in the system to learn more quickly.
This test only applies to MMH, since ARH explicitly directs how hearsay information is to be
incorporated into an agent's reputation tables.  For MMH we define the HEARSAY
parameter as the fraction at which reference reputations are incorporated into the prior
probability of success with a given supplier agent. So if HEARSAY=1.0, this means that
each reputation value passed to an agent in a referral is counted equivalent to the agent's own
personal experience when updating the prior probability.  If HEARSAY=0.5, then the value
of referral reputations is discounted to half of the agent's own experience, and if
HEARSAY=0, then this is equivalent to no hearsay evidence included at all.  
8.2.3.2  Results for MMH Model
The test is a mixture of 50% GOOD and 50% BAD agents.  The results are pictured in Figure
10.  Clearly with no HEARSAY, the system requires slightly more time to learn, requiring
3800 encounters to reach its maximum level of success max≈0.97   Slight
improvements occur however, when HEARSAY is increased to 0.6, and maximum level of
success value max is reached within 2400 encounters.  We don't see any further
improvements as HEARSAY is increased up to 1.0, so it seems the law of diminishing
returns begins taking effect.  Other experiments recounted in this paper generally use
HEARSAY=0.4, since not much improvement is noted at larger values.
8.2.3.3  Discussion
In the quest to eliminate the negative effects that deception can have on reputation systems,
some researchers have eliminated hearsay from their models.  However, it is an important
part of reputation, and this test shows that it can effect the learning rate.
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Figure 10: Effects of Varied Hearsay with MMH
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8.2.4  Test Case: Effects of World Size
8.2.4.1  Description
This test traces the effects of world size on the ability for the reputation system to accurately
sort GOOD agents from BAD.  This test is run with a 50/50% mix of GOOD to BAD agents,
and is run over the course of 100,000 total encounters.  The test is run for populations of 100,
400, and 700 agents.
8.2.4.2  Results for MMH Model
The chart below depicts the trajectory of MMH towards max .  Smaller world sizes such
as 100 agents only takes approximately 1900 encounters to reach a 90% success rate.  Larger
world sizes such as 400 and 700 agents appear that they will not reach a 90% success rate
until encounters 10,700 and 29,500 respectively.  It is evident from the data that for large
populations, reputation systems must use other methods to enable agents to get adequate
reputation information efficiently.  



























Figure 11: MMH Reputation System with Varied World Size
8.2.4.3  Results for ARH Model
ARH requires a lot of storage, so this test was one of the most memory intensive tests run.
For a population of 700 agents, this test required a JVM which had 1Gb of memory allocated
to it. The chart below shows that ARH's performance for larger world sizes is significantly
worse than MMH. Smaller world sizes such as 100 agents take approximately 15,000
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encounters to reach a 90% success rate.  Larger world sizes such as 400 and 700 agents
appear that they will not reach a 90% success rate until encounters 120,000 and 200,000
respectively.  
Clearly the ARH reputation system is very sensitive to world size and thus should employ
group reputations or other techniques in order to be successful tracking the reputations of a
large number of agents.



























Figure 12: ARH Reputation System with Varied World Size
8.2.4.4  Discussion
World size may be the biggest obstacle to using reputation systems successfully in the real
world.  Both MMH and ARH were slow to sort through larger numbers of agents, and we
clearly would not be able to extend this experiment to a real world number, like 10,000
agents.  Here are some alternative ways of coping with large populations that could be
considered for future work:
• Instead of expecting referrer agents to have information about just any supplier randomly
chosen, ask them to specifically point out which agents on which they have collected good
reputation information that will meet the need.
• Increase the number of referrers and/or the number of choices proportionate to the world
size.
• Use group reputation to communicate reputation more efficiently through a large
population.
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8.2.5  Test Case: Effects of Varying Number of Choices
8.2.5.1  Description
Our simulation protocol calls for each agent to select c agents at random as potential supplier
agents for its next interaction.  The agent evaluates the reputations of each of these suppliers
and then selects the one with the best reputation.  It stands to reason that an agent would be
able to improve its level of success by selecting more suppliers to choose from.  This test
varies the number of choices, c, and tracks the resulting level of success for each of our
reputation systems.
We recall that the maximum level of success is max=P good agents≥1=1−R b 
c
and varying c will impact the results the simulation is able to attain.  For these simulations we
set Rb = 0.5, so max will have the following values for each value of c tested.
Table 6: Λmax Values for Choices c=2..10
8.2.5.2  Results for MMH Model
Figure 13 shows the results of varying choices c from 1..10.  It is clear that MMH very
quickly rises to the max value, and no matter what the value of c is, MMH reaches
max after approximately the same number of encounters every time.















































Figure 13: MMH with Varied Number of Choices
8.2.5.3  Results for ARH Model
Figure 14 shows the results for the ARH reputation system.  ARH takes significantly longer
to reach max --13,500 encounters for c=2, and 26,700 encounters for c=3. As c increases,
the number of encounters required to reach max continues to increases dramatically.  Over
the course of the 30,000 encounters run in this test, the highest level of success attained by
ARH was 0.976 for c=10 choices.  This is well short of the maximum level of success, and it
is again apparent that it will require a very large number of training encounters to eliminate
the top 2% of failures possible using the ARH model.
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Figure 14: ARH with Varied Number of Choices
8.2.5.4  Discussion
Our predictions on max were realized in this test, and we see once again how MMH learns
much faster than ARH, no matter how few or how many choices are assigned.  At this world
size there seems to be diminishing returns once c is set to 5 or higher.  Since this parameter
corresponds directly to the amount of communication that must take place per encounter, it is
important to discover at what point additional choices become irrelevant.
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8.2.6  Test Case: Effects of Number of Referrals
8.2.6.1  Description
As described earlier, the Resource Game requires each agent to select c supplier candidates
from the simulated world.  The agent then requests reputation information on these supplier
candidates from a number of referral agents.  We presume that getting referrals from more
agents will increase the accuracy of the reputation information that is received. This in turn
should increase the rate at which the simulation becomes successful.
Also, since each of the r referral agents is queried once for each of c choices, there are
c×r communications which must take place prior to every interaction.  It is therefore
helpful to know how useful these communications are to the overall success of the agent in
obtaining useful reputation data.
8.2.6.2  Results for MMH Model
Figure 15 shows MMH results after varying the number of referral agents used to make a
decision on choosing a supplier.  Once again, this simulation uses a 50/50 mix of GOOD and
BAD agents.  We see that the overall level of success is increased by adding referral agents,
but not as dramatically as it was increased as in the last test case by adding choices.  Also,
there are diminishing returns once r=8.  The improvement seen with r set at greater values
than 8 are negligible.

































Figure 15: MMH with Varied Number of Referrals
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8.2.6.3  Results for ARH Model
The results for ARH are interesting in that they do not reflect our postulate that increases in
referrals should increase the overall success of the reputation system.  Success levels increase
at generally the same pace no matter what r is set at.

































Figure 16: ARH with Varied Number of Referrals
8.2.6.4  Discussion
It is apparent that the number of referrals is not a large factor in the rate of learning.  By
default we have chosen to perform most of the simulations documented here with a default
number of referrals set to 10.  By fixing the referrals and choices during simulations, we
ensure that we are comparing reputation systems alone, not differences that may be
introduced by variations in the amount of communication.
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8.2.7  Test Case: Reversal of Behavior
8.2.7.1  Description
Up until now, we have focused on the ability of a reputation system to quickly learn about its
environment and apply it within the context of the Resource Game.  However, a reputation
system must not only be able to quickly acquire the information necessary to distinguish
between cooperative and non-cooperative agents, but it must be able to react appropriately
when agents act in a way that goes against their reputation.  This test looks at the ability to
reverse learned reputations.
As a fairly extreme example, we will take 10 agents, half of which are GOOD and half of
which are BAD.  In the simulation the GOOD and BAD agents suddenly switch strategies so
that the GOOD agents behave badly and the BAD agents behave cooperatively.  The question
is then how long it will take for the reputation systems to reflect the switch.
8.2.7.2  Results for MMH Model
The MMH model which performs so well in terms of speed reaching the maximum level of
success, is very challenged by this simulation. Figure 17 shows that it becomes immediately
paralyzed once the change in strategy occurs and does not begin to recover until encounter
64,500.  At that point it quickly rises to the maximum level of success, but by this time it has
lost significant ground to ARH.


























Figure 17: Comparison of Trust Models with Reversal of Behavior
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8.2.7.3  Results for ARH Model
ARH, which generally has a much slower way of attaining success compared to MMH,
shines in this example by quickly recovering once the change in strategy occurs. It begins to
have successful interactions by encounter 9700, and rather quickly works its way up to the
maximum level of success.  The difference is apparent in Figure 17, but is also highlighted by
the fact that in this window of 100,000 encounters, ARH has more than 3 times the successes
compared to MMH.
8.2.7.4  Discussion
Both ARH and MMH have trouble adjusting to a dramatic change in environment.  Despite
the fact that they are intended to change when the environment changes, they find it hard to
do so in this extreme example.  At no time during this test is it impossible to have successful
interactions – as soon as the group of GOOD agents turns hostile, the group of BAD agents
turns GOOD.  However it is necessary that the reputation systems experience a lot of failure
to counter the successes that they initially achieved.  The next section will go into depth
about ways in which we can improve the MMH reputation system to perform better under
this circumstance of reversal of behavior.
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9 Improvements to Reputation Systems
Given the definitions that we have proposed for defining and simulating a reputation system,
we attempt to improve on these systems by manipulating two aspects: the agent's level of
trust and the agent's level of experience.
9.1  Trust Level Management
9.1.1  Description
We have defined reputation b
a earlier to be the expectation of success that an agent a has
that agent b will act in a beneficial way towards a.  Also, we have defined trust level a to
be the minimum perceived expectation of success that an agent a is willing to accept prior to
initiating an interaction.  Since min≤a≤max it is possible we may gain improvements on
the overall success of an agent by manipulating the trust level dependent on the level of
success an individual agent has.  
This situation is analogous to the difference between a person who has been successful in the
marketplace versus a person who is continually unsuccessful.  The successful person will
have high expectations for the reputations of the people they transact business with.
Likewise, if the same person were placed in a hostile environment where they suddenly began
experiencing a high degree of failures, high expectations for reputation would prevent some
failed transactions, but they would have to relax their reputation requirement in order to do
any business at all.
We propose that one way of maximizing success and minimizing failure in a hostile or
rapidly changing environment is to perform trust level management.  For our Trust Level
Management method we propose that agents mimic the real-world behavior of “once bitten,
twice shy.”  In other words, agents become “shy” of future encounters if they have
experienced too much failure in the past.  This is similar to natural defense mechanisms seen
repeatedly in nature.  After a period of time, the agent loses its shyness and re-engages other
agents.  It is our expectation that this would have a positive effect on the overall success of
agents in a hostile environment.
We define Trust Level Management as an operation of two functions, a trigger function ftrigger,
and a decay function fdecay .  So for an agent a, its trust level is a  g  f trigger , f decay Agents
are able to use the following data points as input to the trigger function:  
• The number of failures the agent has recorded locally (tfailure)
• The number of successes the agent has recorded locally (tsuccess)
• The rate at which failures and successes are increasing or decreasing
Later on we will describe experiments with various equations for the trigger and decay
functions and see what effect they have in different simulated situations.
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9.1.2  Definitions
First it should be noted that we assume that agents only have information from their own
histories available for managing trust.  The simulation environment does not provide the
capability for agents to query each other in order to make trust level decisions.  An agent's
history is also limited to reduce storage requirements.  
With this as a starting point agent a has the ability to calculate a few useful metrics.  Agent
a's failure rate is calculated by dividing a's level of failure within the window  of its
history H', or a /  Likewise, agent a's success rate is calculated as a /
Agent a can also estimate the rate of change of the number of failures or successes by
dividing the agent's history window in half and calculating the slope.  If a
1 is the level of
success in the first half of the history window, and a
2 is the level of success in the second
half, the rate of change for successes is a
1−a
2//2 and the rate of change for failures
is  1a− 
2
a //2
9.1.3  Test Cases
9.1.3.1  EQN10: Triggering based on Failure Rate
In developing test cases, we presume that a good trigger function will be one which triggers
when the agent finds itself in a sufficiently bad environment.  Therefore we will define four
different ftrigger functions.  The first function, referred to as EQN10, triggers shyness when the
failure rate is greater than a certain value TRUST_THRESHOLD.  This follows the inference
that an agent should stop attempting to interact when the environment has become too
hostile.
Our initial test case will be using the 50/50 mix of GOOD and BAD agents, and the results
are shown in Figure 18.  The decay function which was used is linear over the a number of
interactions equal to the parameter TRUST_DECAY.  TRUST_THRESHOLD was set to a
constant value of 0.8.  Figure 18 shows that there is a slight decrease in the rate of growth as
TRUST_DECAY increases, and in each case adding Trust Level Management results in
fewer successes overall.
Next we examine the results using the reversed learning test which has a mix of 5 GOOD and
5 BAD agents which switch strategies after 500 encounters.  As shown earlier, MMH
performed very poorly on this test, and we would like to see if we can improve things by
managing trust levels.  Figure 19 shows that Trust Level Management has significantly
lengthened the time required to recover in the reversal of behavior test defined in section
8.2.7.  Also, increasing TRUST_DECAY, only worsens the effect.  This is because
unlearning requires failure, and trust level management is avoidance of failure. 
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Figure 18:  50/50 Good/Bad Mix with EQN10 Trigger Function






























Figure 19: Reversal of Behavior Test with EQN10 Trigger Function
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While the number of successes decreased is apparent in Figure 19, unseen is the number of
times there was no interaction because Trust Level Management assigned a trust level high
enough to eliminate all of the choices from an encounter.  The results can be seen if we
calculate the score  of each trial run, as defined in section 7.4.4.2.  Figure 20 shows the
scores obtained from different values of TRUST_DECAY applied to EQN10.  Only one
value, TRUST_DECAY=8, results in a score that is slightly less than MMH without Trust
Level Management.  The remainder are significantly worse than MMH.
Figure 20: Scores from Reversal of Behavior Test with EQN10 Trigger Function
By examining the results of the tests with EQN10, we can draw a few conclusions. First,
increasing the decay time almost always results in fewer successes overall. This finding
makes sense in light of the game and the MMH reputation model.  The key factor for doing
well on the 50/50 Good-Bad Test is to learn reputation quickly.  Increasing trust level slows
down this process, and increased decay times will only slow the process down more.
Secondly, attempts to reduce failures by using a trigger function that is keyed off of failure
rate seems to result in very slow recovery time in in the Reversal of Behavior test. Again,
efforts to manage trust level reduce the number of interactions that an agent will have, both
successful and unsuccessful.  This slows down the re-learning process necessary to succeed
in this test.  Lastly, the fact that the overall scores achieved with EQN10 are generally lower
than the score of MMH only shows that the interactions that our agents avoided would have
been successful at least as frequently as they would have been unsuccessful.
Lastly, triggering with failure rate does not even increase the overall score that a model
achieves in the simulation.
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9.1.3.2  EQN11: Triggering based on Success Rate
If triggering on failure rate doesn't give good results, perhaps triggering on success rate will
give good results.  The challenge in the Reversal of Behavior Test is reducing the reputation
of the agents which initially gave good responses down to the reputation values of the agents
which initially gave bad responses (the “un-learning phase”).  Once this happens, agents
have the opportunity to re-sort the population based on their current behavior.  
The second function we examine, EQN11, triggers when the success rate is greater than
TRUST_THRESHOLD.  This test was run in a similar fashion as the previous one, with
TRUST_THRESHOLD set at a constant value of 0.8.  Figure 21 shows the results obtained
for the 50/50 Good/Bad Test.






























Figure 21:  Reversal of Behavior with EQN11 Trigger Function
It is apparent from Figure 21 that, although triggering on success rate prevents a steep rise
initially in successes (and the steep rise in average reputation that accompanies that), it also
prevents the simulation from reaching its potential later on, once the un-learning phase has
completed.  Also, despite the fact that so many success opportunities were passed by in the
first 5000 encounters, this did not seem to result in a shortening of the un-learning phase.
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9.1.3.3  EQN12 and EQN13: Triggering based on Rate of Change
Given the lessons learned from trigger functions EQN10 and EQN11, we refine our trigger
function by defining it based on rates of change. We speculate that our opportunity to
improve in the Reversal of Behavior test is by flattening the initial wave of successes so that
the un-learning phase will be shorter and overall score will be improved.  
EQN12 triggers when the rate of change for successes exceeds a constant parameter
TRUST_THRESHOLD.  In order to cover all bases, we also define EQN13 which triggers
when either the rate of change for successes or the rate of change for failures exceeds
TRUST_THRESHOLD.
Figures 22 and 23 show the results for EQN12.  As predicted, the initial learning phase is
slowed by managing trust based on rates of change.  However, in Figure 22, this does not
impede the eventual growth to max  When we examine the Reversal of Behavior test
(Figure 23), we see that EQN12 gives us a slight improvement (about 1%) because the “un-
learning phase” starts as much as 700 encounters earlier than MMH. When score  is
considered, the results are improved about 0.6%.






























Figure 22:  50/50 Good/Bad Mix with EQN12 Trigger Function
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Figure 23:  Reversal of Behavior Test with EQN12 Trigger Function
Given the fact that EQN13 triggers on either the rate of change for successes or the rate of
change for failures, we would hope to get better results with this trigger function. In fact,
EQN13 does improve slightly on EQN12, but not by much.  Figures 24 and 25 show that
EQN13 does in fact have a slower learning rate than EQN12.  When applied to the Reversal
of Behavior test, however, the start of the “un-learning” phase begins at the same time as
EQN12 (1% better than MMH), and the score creeps up to 0.7% improvement over MMH.
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Figure 24:  50/50 Good/Bad Mix with EQN13 Trigger Function






























Figure 25:  Reversal of Behavior Test with EQN13 Trigger Function
4/29/2005 A Comparison of Reputation-based Trust Systems  59
9.1.3.4  Variations of the Trust Threshold
Now that we have arrived at some trigger functions that show that Trust Level Management
can provide minor improvement over MMH, we will attempt to tune these trigger functions
for our test cases by examining the effects of varying the TRUST_THRESHOLD parameter.
In prior experiments we have arbitrarily set TRUST_THRESHOLD=0.8.  We presume that
larger values will decrease the rate of success on the initial phase of the Reversal of Behavior
test, and smaller values will increase the initial rate of success, making the results look more
like MMH without Trust Level Management applied.































Figure 26:  50/50 Good/Bad Mix with EQN13 Trigger and Varying Threshold
Judging the results of the 50/50 Good/Bad Mix test in Figure 26, our conclusion is correct
that smaller values of TRUST_THRESHOLD yield a slower learning rate at the beginning of
the simulation.  Larger values such as 1.0 are still slower than MMH without Trust Level
Management.  Now we compare these results to those in Figure 27, the Reversal of Behavior
test, and we see that at TRUST_THRESHOLD value 1.0 the slight advantage that TLM has
over the plain MMH system has disappeared.  Thus, the best balance appears to be setting the
threshold to a value of about 0.8.
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Figure 27:  Reversal of Behavior Test with EQN13 Trigger and Varying Threshold
9.1.3.5  Variations of the Decay Function
All of the tests run so far have only manipulated the trigger function or the duration of the
decay.  Now we will focus on fine tuning the decay function itself, which until now has been
linear.  Assuming the trust level is immediately set to the maximum reputation value (1.0 in
MMH) when “triggered”, decay tells us at what rate the trust level decreases, intersecting
with 0.0 once the decay duration has been reached.  So, for a decay duration of 4, the
resulting trust level values of three decay functions are seen in Table 6.
Table 7: Trust Level Values for Various Decay Functions
If time is represented by t and the decay duration is d, we define Linear as =1−t /d 
SQRT as =1−t /d  and No Decay as =1 if t=0 ;0 otherwise   Figures 28 and 29
show the results of these functions given a decay duration of 4 encounters.
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Time Trust LevelLinear SQRT No Decay
0 1 1 1
1 0.75 0.5 0
2 0.5 0.29 0
3 0.25 0.13 0
4 0 0 0

























EQN13 w/ Linear Decay
EQN13 w/ SQRT Decay
EQN13 w/ No Decay
Figure 28:  50/50 Good/Bad Mix with EQN13 Trigger and Various Decay Functions

























EQN13 w/ Linear Decay
EQN13 w/ SQRT Decay
EQN13 w/ No Decay
Figure 29:  Reversal of Behavior Test with EQN13 Trigger and Various Decay Functions
62 A Comparison of Reputation-based Trust Systems        4/29/2005
The first thing to note from these results is the significant delay that the SQRT decay function
puts into the 50/50 Good/Bad Mix test.   However, the upside of SQRT is that this delay
helps the reputation system un-learn faster in the Reversal of Behavior test – shortening the
unlearning phase by 3300 encounters, and improvement of about 5.5%.  As expected, the No
Decay function (essentially a decay duration of 1) maps closest to the original MMH results,
but does deliver a slight shortening of the unlearning phase by 200 encounters.
If we compare the score metrics  for these decay functions (Tables 7 and 8) we see that
no matter which decay function is used, any improvement in the Reversal of Behavior test
seems to be offset by a corresponding decrease in the 50/50 Good/Bad Mix.  
Table 8: Comparison of Decay Functions in 50/50 Good/Bad Mix
Table 9: Comparison of Decay Functions in Reversal of Behavior Test
9.1.4  Conclusion
After much experimentation, we conclude that there is no significant advantage to using trust
level management for improving the accuracy or performance of the base reputation system.
Trust level management can be used to improve relearning rates, but these improvements
come at the cost of decreases in the rate of initial learning.  Also, the concept of “shyness”,
while seeming good to protect against negative encounters in a hostile environment, has the
disadvantage of not imparting any information about changes in the environment.  So,
placing our agents in a hostile environment, the more encounters they avoid, the less
opportunity they will have to take advantage of successful encounters later.
We now propose addressing MMH's re-learning challenges by limiting the amount of
encounters that are used to calculate reputation by creating an experience window, i.e. only
counting the last n encounters when calculating reputation.
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MMH Linear SQRT No Decay
Score 27384 26808 23932 27307
Difference 0.0% -2.1% -12.6% -0.3%
MMH Linear SQRT No Decay
Score -48993 -48730 -45013 -48801
Difference 0.0% 0.5% 8.1% 0.4%
9.2  Experience Windows
9.2.1  Description
Experience windows are the second means we propose of improving MMH.  By this we
mean varying the amount of history an agent keeps for calculating reputation.  In situations
where the environment is changing rapidly, agents will have difficulty “unlearning” the
behaviors they expect from their neighbors, and experience windows are intended to speed
this process.  
Unfortunately, experience windows come with a disadvantage as well: while an experience
window speeds the “unlearning” process, it also removes information which might prove
useful.  Perhaps an agent has a distant memory of an interaction with a certain agent who
behaved badly.  An experience window eventually erases this memory leaving the agent
vulnerable to making the same mistake with the badly behaving agent.
For our purposes we define an experience window size  as the number of interactions
remembered, and a reputation re-calculation parameter as the number of interactions
between recalculations of the experience window.  Reputation is re-calculated from agent
history using the rules from the reputation system as if the previous encounters had never
occurred.  So, for example, if our experience window size is 200 encounters and our
reputation re-calculation parameter is 300 encounters, then at encounters <300, all history
would be used for reputation calculations, but at encounter 300 the first 100 encounters are
removed from a reputation window and decisions are now based on the more recent
encounters 101-300.
9.2.2  Test Cases
In order to test reputation windows, we will define TMMH as MMH using EQN13 trigger
function, the SQRT decay function, and decay value of 4.  Additionally, TMMH uses
reputation windows, and we will test multiple reputation window sizes.
9.2.2.1  50/50 Good/Bad Mix
Because agents don't change strategies mid-course in this test, using a reputation window
makes no difference on this test, as long as the size exceeds the number of agents in the
simulation.  Known GOOD agents always receive better reputation scores than known BAD
agents, and it only takes one encounter with an agent to know its inclinations.  Simulations
performed on an environment with 100 agents returned exactly the same results as MMH
when reputation windows of 400 to 2000 encounters were used.
9.2.2.2  Reversal of Behavior 
Reversal of Behavior is the test on which we would like to see improvement.  As predicted,
adding a reputation window to MMH dramatically improves the re-learning time for the
Reversal of Behavior test.  Results for reputation windows ranging from 400 to 2000
encounters are seen in Figure 30.
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Figure 30:  Reversal of Behavior Test with TMMH and Various Experience Window Sizes
9.2.2.3  Average Reputation
Figure 31 shows average reputation for a mix of one third GOOD agents, one third BAD
agents, and one third RANDOM agents as in Section 8.2.2.  Because TMMH is set to “shift”
the reputation window every 100 encounters (as counted per agent), there is a marked change
in reputation values at every 10,000 encounters (as counted globally) that is visible.  This is
because information is lost as the reputation window is shifted.  The result is lower calculated
probability of success (for the GOOD agents) and a higher calculated probability of success
(for the BAD agents). This is only a problem in the current type of simulation, as long as the
reputation window exceeds the number of agents in the simulated environment.  However,
for some applications this could be problematic.
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Figure 31:  Average Reputation for Good/Bad/Random Agents with TMMH 
9.2.3  Conclusion
Using an experience window is a useful modification to MMH, since without it a change in
behavior takes too long to be reflected in the agent's reputation.  There are some caveats to its
use, however.  Experience windows do lose information, and in an environment where
interactions are not determined by an even random distribution there will be results from
agent interactions lost as time progresses.  Not every application will be able to tolerate that
loss of information, particularly those which have a low tolerance for failure.
Also, when an experience window is recalculated, MMH reputations are recalculated back
towards the initial neutral value of 0.5, and this goes against MMH's careful definition of
reputation as a probability of success.  Instead we are making a judgment that recent behavior
is more likely to re-occur than more distant behavior, and this may not always be the case in
every application.
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10  Further Results
10.1  Description
In this section we will analyze all three reputation systems, MMH, ARH, and MMH with
Trust Level Management (TMMH), in more complex scenarios.  The first of these scenarios
is where agents behave with strategies that oscillate between GOOD and bad behavior at
some interval.  The second scenario introduces deception, where a certain population of the
simulated world lies about the reputation of their neighbors when acting as referrers for other
agents.
10.2  Oscillating Strategies
In order to present a more complex simulation case, we have implemented the capability for
agents to oscillate between GOOD and bad strategies at a pre-defined frequency.  This
extends the analysis done in the Reversal of Behavior test (see section 8.2.7) by examining
changes in reputation when behavior changes frequently.
10.2.1  Test Case: Reputation of Agents with Oscillating Strategies
10.2.1.1  Description
Initially we would like to see how well each of the models performs under a more complex
scenario which includes agents with different strategies.  This simulation is populated with a
mixture of agents, 20% which have a GOOD strategy, 20% which have a BAD strategy, 20%
which have a RANDOM strategy, 20% oscillate between GOOD and BAD behavior every 50
encounters (GOOD_BAD), and 20% also oscillate but start with BAD behavior and change
to GOOD every 50 encounters (BAD_GOOD).  
10.2.1.2  Results for MMH Model
The MMH reputation system shows in Figure 32 that it treats BAD_GOOD agents in almost
the same way as BAD agents, assuming that because they started out with BAD behavior that
they will not improve.  The reputation score decreases so quickly that oscillating
BAD_GOOD agents have almost no opportunity to compete with RANDOM and
GOOD_BAD agents for selection as a resource supplier.  GOOD_BAD agents fare better in
this scenario. Since their reputation initially increase, they are more likely to be selected and
their reputation scores reflect the oscillating behavior to a very slight degree.  The oscillating
behavior is more visible in the changes in level of success which decreases whenever the
GOOD_BAD agents turn to BAD behavior. 
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Figure 32:  Average Reputations with Oscillating Behavior (MMH) 
10.2.1.3  Results for ARH Model
Figure 33 shows the results of this simulation with the ARH model.  Because ARH
reputation values increase and decrease less quickly in response to success and failure than
MMH, both GOOD_BAD and BAD_GOOD agents have opportunity to be selected, and the
resulting reputation values therefore reflect the oscillating behavior quite clearly.
Unfortunately, despite the fact that ARH reputation more accurately represents the agents'
oscillation, the ARH reputation model still can not anticipate the changes that oscillation
introduces, and fares worse overall than MMH does with regard to level of success.
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Figure 33:  Average Reputations with Oscillating Behavior (ARH) 
10.2.1.4  Results for MMH Model with TLM
When we add trust level management and reputation windows to MMH (referred to as
TMMH from now on), the results are similar to MMH.  However, the impact of the
reputation window is seen clearly in the average reputation of the GOOD, BAD, and
BAD_GOOD agents.  Presumably this is much more visible with these strategies because
because the rates of change of reputation are much higher with these strategies as compared
to RANDOM and GOOD_BAD.  Also, the peaks and valleys shown in TMMH's level of
success are generally wider than MMH's level of success. This is probably due to the slightly
slower learning rate that TMMH exhibits compared to MMH.
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Figure 34:  Average Reputations with Oscillating Behavior (TMMH) 
10.2.1.5  Discussion
Oscillation is difficult for any reputation system to deal with, since reputation is by definition
a reflection of past behavior and oscillation prescribes a behavior that is diametrically
opposed to past behavior.  Peak reputation values shown in this test consistently trail the
associated peak in level of success by 1,000 - 3,000 encounters which shows that our
reputation systems are slow to reflect the real situation. This might lead to the conclusion that
the best approach for handling oscillation would be to design a model which drops an agent's
reputation back to neutral at the first or second indication of a change in behavior.  This
would likely be vulnerable to other environmental challenges, however, and we leave this as
an open question to be examined in future work.
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10.2.2  Test Case: Effects of Varying Frequencies of Oscillation 
10.2.2.1  Description
Like the previous test case, this one uses a mixture of agents with different strategies. The
simulation is populated with 20% GOOD agents, 20% BAD agents, 20% RANDOM agents,
20% oscillating (first GOOD then BAD), and 20% oscillating (first BAD then GOOD).
Oscillating agents change strategies every 25, 50, 75, and 100 individual encounters.  
10.2.2.2  Results for MMH Model
MMH performed the best of the three in terms of overall level of success.  From Figure 35 it
is clear that the level of success follows the pattern of oscillation exhibited by the set of
agents with the GOOD_BAD strategy. While the swings in the graph are sized proportionally
with the frequency as expected, it is interesting to note that the size of swings does not
decrease with time.  This seems to indicate that MMH has not learned more about the
environment at 30,000 encounters than it knew at 10,000 encounters. 




























Figure 35:  MMH with Varied Frequency of Oscillation 
10.2.2.3  Results for ARH Model
The ARH model exhibits the same oscillating level of success in tune with the frequency of
change by the GOOD_BAD agents.  Compared to MMH, the highest levels of success are
approximately 80% instead of 90-95%.  However, one interesting note is that, unlike MMH,
the oscillations begin to dampen as time goes on, indicating that the model reacts to lessons
learned and there is less of a swing every time the agents oscillate behavior.  Unfortunately,
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along with the smaller swing, the level of success seems to trend downward as behavior is
learned.  This is especially evident with the lower frequency values.




























Figure 36:  ARH with Varied Frequency of Oscillation 
10.2.2.4  Results for MMH Model with TLM
The TMMH results, shown in Figure 37, exhibit similar shape and size oscillation as
compared to MMH.  However, the level of success is significantly smaller with maximums at
around 80%.  While TMMH has significantly fewer successes, in terms of score, TMMH
performed on a par with MMH (see Figure 38).  This is yet another indication that
maximizing success requires taking risks, risks that TMMH with its trust level management
scheme is not as willing to take as MMH.
10.2.2.5  Discussion
Increasing the frequency of oscillating behavior does not significantly change the overall
level of success or score that any of these models can achieve.  While level of success
oscillates with the changes in strategy of the GOOD_BAD agents, only ARH seems to react
negatively by giving GOOD_BAD agents progressively lower reputation ratings over time.
This results in ARH agents occasionally selecting RANDOM and BAD agents instead of the
oscillating agents and this contributes to an overall decline in level of success.
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Figure 37:  TMMH with Varied Frequency of Oscillation
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Figure 38:  MMH, ARH, and TMMH Scores with Varied Frequency of Oscillation
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10.3  Effects of Deception 
One of the problems with using reputation in the real world is that opinions vary and reports
of an individual's reputation are exaggerated because of the subjectivity that is involved with
reputation.  It is clear that automated reputation systems must be somewhat vulnerable to
attacks involving deception. In this suite of tests we examine which types of deception are
most effective in thwarting each of the reputation systems and what level of tolerance each
system has to deceptive agents.
10.3.1  Test Case:  Types of Deception
10.3.1.1  Description
In order to test deception we define a certain subset of agents as deceptive using the
DECEPTIVE_RATIO parameter.  We define deception as a modification of reputation 
that is made whenever reputation is requested from an outside agent.  Naturally, we make an
assumption that agents calculate reputation correctly for their own interactions. After Yu and
Singh [25] we define three different types of deception: complementary, exaggerated
positive, and exaggerated negative. In each, deception is an operation which returns a
fictional reputation  ' which is based on the agent's real reputation value  , the
maximum reputation value Pmax , and an exaggeration coefficient  such that 01
The deception types are as follows:
• Complementary:  '=Pmax−
• Exaggerated positive:  '=−
• Exaggerated negative:  '=−/Pmax−
While it may be a large assumption that deceptive agents will always behave badly in the
simulation, we have elected to first assign the role of deceiver to agents which have a BAD
strategy, then select RANDOM and GOOD agents once we have run out of BAD agents.
This was done to give ARH the benefit of the doubt, since ARH takes agent reputation into
account when weighting referral information in its calculations.
Also, deceptive agents do not always return deceptive results, but select certain targets about
which to lie.  These targets are selected from the pool of GOOD agents first, then RANDOM,
then BAD, in an effort to highlight the impacts of deception, and the number of targets is set
by the parameter TARGET_RATIO. After the simulation, we will examine the level of
success for the entire simulation environment over time and see how this is effected by the
introduction of deception.
10.3.1.2  Results for MMH Model
The results of MMH are shown in Figure 39 which gives us the first indications of how
deception affects reputation results.  This simulation was performed with 20% deceptive
agents which were targeting 60% of the total agents, and the exaggeration coefficient was set
to 0.5.  Exaggerated negative seems to have little effect on overall success, and since GOOD
agents are assigned as targets, it seems that exaggerated positive deception results in reaching
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the maximum level of success very quickly.  Complementary deception results in the most
visible negative impact to overall success.






























Figure 39: Results of MMH with Varied Deception Types
4/29/2005 A Comparison of Reputation-based Trust Systems  75
10.3.1.3  Results for ARH Model
ARH reacts somewhat differently to the different deception types in Figure 40.  Here
exaggerated positive is the least harmful, but still not as beneficial as with MMH.
Exaggerated negative has a much more pronounced effect on the results than in MMH, and
while ARH uses the semantic distance method of recalibrating the results of consistent under-
estimators, it seems not to have effected the results for exaggerated negative deception very
much.  Lastly, complementary deception is once again proven to be the most damaging to
overall success.






























Figure 40: Results of ARH with Varied Deception Types
10.3.1.4  Results for MMH Model with TLM
Trust Level Management does not make significant differences on how MMH responds to
deception, but careful examination of Figure 41 will show a slight depression in the level of
success at approximately 10,000 and 20,000 encounters, particularly for complementary
deception. This is due to the limited reputation window, and the effects of this window will
become more evident in future tests.
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Figure 41: Results of TMMH with Varied Deception Types
10.3.1.5  Discussion
It is clear from the data that a 20% population of liars can have a significant impact on the
level of success enjoyed by the entire population of agents.  While exaggerated positive and
negative deception types seem capable of reaching the maximum level of success max ,
complementary deception runs into a barrier in all three reputation systems.  For the
remainder of the tests we will focus on complementary deception in order to determine the
tolerance that each system has against deception.
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10.3.2  Test Case: Number of Deceptive Agents
10.3.2.1  Description
As in [25], we are interested in finding out what level of tolerance a reputation system has for
deception.  We predict that as the number of liars increase in the agent population, overall
success levels will be adversely impacted.  In the worst case scenario, perhaps deception
would make the level of success dip below the 50% mark, which in the case of a 50/50 mix
of GOOD and BAD agents would be worse than choosing randomly without the assistance of
a reputation system.  In this test we examine the effects of increasing the number of deceptive
agents from 0 to 100%.  Like the previous test, we choose first BAD agents to be deceptive,
then GOOD agents once we have exhausted the population of BAD agents.  In all of these
tests we limit the target agents to only 20% of the population.
10.3.2.2  Results for MMH Model
In Figure 42 we see the unusual results of increasing the number of deceptive agents with the
MMH reputation model.  Initially increasing the number of deceptive agents steadily
decreases the maximum level of success that MMH can achieve, up until 50%. Once the level
of deceptive agents exceeds 50%, the level of success starts to increase once again, until with
100% deceptive agents, MMH is enjoying a maximum level of success equal to the
simulation which did not have any deception.  This behavior makes sense when we consider
that increasing deception to 100% of the population evenly distributes the lies and allows
MMH to learn behavior more easily.  
  














































Figure 42: Results of MMH with Varied Number of Deceptive Agents
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10.3.2.3  Results for ARH Model
ARH demonstrates a much more even distribution of performance with an increase in
deceptive agents resulting in decreases in overall performance that are very proportional to
the number of deceptive agents.  Note that as deceptive agents approaches 100%, ARH can
only attain a 50% success level – equal to randomly selecting agents with which to interact.














































Figure 43: Results of ARH with Varied Number of Deceptive Agents
10.3.2.4  Results for MMH Model with TLM
When we add Trust Level Management to MMH, we immediately see the impact of
reputation windows on our results (Figure 44).  At encounters 10,000 and 20,000, the
approximate times when agents would be trimming back their reputation windows, we see a
large dip in level of success for the simulations of 50% deception and greater.  This is
because success at these levels of deception requires a great deal of prior knowledge about
the environment.  Once the reputation windows is trimmed back, this learning process must
take place all over again.
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Figure 44: Results of TMMH with Varied Number of Deceptive Agents
10.3.2.5  Discussion
In comparison, MMH performs significantly better than ARH with regard to deception, even
compensating for deception once lying becomes rampant in the environment.  This is
somewhat surprising since ARH is designed to be resilient to references from agents which
are not in line with real experiences, and the designers of MMH have not explicitly made
resistance to deception one of their design goals.  However, neither of the models holds up
well to large numbers of deceptive agents.  Also TMMH shows the weakness of retaining
limited amounts of history in this test as each agent must relearn its environment whenever
the reputation window is recalculated.
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10.3.3  Test Case: Number of Deception Targets
10.3.3.1  Description
While it is apparent that an overall increase in deception will decrease the effectiveness of a
reputation system, it is possible that the reputation system will be able to recognize deception
which comes from a certain population of agents and accommodate by discounting the
opinions of those agents.  In this test case we fix the number of deceptive agents at 20% and
vary the amount of lies they tell, by varying the TARGET_RATIO.
10.3.3.2  Results for MMH Model
The results for MMH, shown in Figure 45, indicate that level of success is not impacted until
the TARGET_RATIO exceeds 50%.  Remembering that the first 50% of targets will be
GOOD agents, we can conclude MMH experiences no detrimental effects until the deceptive
agents begin to overrate BAD agents. At the point that BAD agents begin to receive
complementary reputation ratings, MMH starts to have difficulty distinguishing between the
agents with GOOD and BAD strategies.
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Figure 45: Maximum Level of Success for Varied Number of Targeted Agents
10.3.3.3  Results for ARH Model
ARH shows a much more measured decline in level of success, almost appearing
proportional with the increase in targeted agents. Eventually it levels off at approximately
75% success.
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10.3.3.4  Results for MMH Model with TLM
The TMMH reputation system fared about the same as MMH throughout this test, only
outperforming MMH when the number of targets exceeded 90% of the total population.   The
improvement at this high rate of deception is likely due to the fact that information is being
lost over the course of the simulation because of the sliding reputation window. At target
levels of 90% and greater, a large portion of the information collected is actually
misinformation. This means that with a smaller memory for interactions, TMMH has an
advantage over MMH because it remembers less of the incorrect information.
10.3.3.5  Discussion
All three of the models presented in this section are somewhat vulnerable to deception and
have decreasing level of success as the number of lies told increases.  MMH has better
resistance to deception overall than ARH or TMMH in this particular circumstance (using
complementary deception), but this advantage could quickly fade given the right kind of lie.
As a general rule, the resistance to deception can likely be improved by tuning the degree to
which “hearsay” evidence is included into the reputation model.  Naturally this has a
disadvantage of negatively impacting the rate at which the agent learns its environment.
However, tuning the degree to which hearsay evidence is introduced seems to be a valid
approach in the real world where statistics about deception can be observed over time. 
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Figure 46: MMH, ARH, and TMMH Resistance to Deception
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11 Analysis and Conclusion 
11.1  Summarized Comparison of Reputation Systems
In this thesis we have compared two reputation systems, ARH and MMH, and proposed a
modified version of MMH which employs trust level management and reputation windows to
enhance its performance under quickly changing conditions.  These reputation systems have
been compared in terms of accuracy, performance, and resistance to deception.
11.1.1  Accuracy
Accuracy is defined as the percentage of successful predictions of behavior, or level of
success.  In comparison with our ideal level of success max , MMH did better than ARH
in approaching levels close to max for the majority of simulations performed.  ARH was
able to eventually reach the level of success that MMH did in some of the simplest
simulations, but as complexity increased, ARH fell further behind.
11.1.2  Performance
Performance and accuracy can be increased by tuning certain parameters; in order to get an
effective reputation system, the environment must be well understood so that these
parameters can be engineered correctly.  In every simulation MMH was able to outperform
ARH and TMMH.  However, since it was the fastest learner, it also had difficulty in
unlearning its environment. MMH's capabilities were most significantly undercut by the
Reversal of Behavior test.  In this test ARH was able to unlearn behavior much faster than
MMH. The modifications proposed to MMH in the form of TMMH show that it is possible
to compensate for this disadvantage. 
11.1.3  Resistance to Deception
In all of the models examined, it seems that the impacts of deception are felt substantially
once the number of liars exceeds 20% of the population.  This is similar to the results found
by Yu and Singh in [25].  Increasing the number of liars, the number of lies they tell, and the
size of the lies are effective in reducing the accuracy and performance of the reputation
systems reviewed here.  One way to counter the effects of deception are to weight each
agent's personal experience higher than hearsay evidence. For this reason MMH, ARH, and
many of the reputation systems surveyed in this paper include methods of weighting hearsay
evidence.
11.2  Contributions
This thesis represents a beginning for objectively comparing reputation systems.  We propose
that reputation and trust are different concepts, and, along with Aberer and Despotovic [2]
that a reputation system is comprised of three components: a mathematical representation of
reputation, a decisioning or trust function, and a communications protocol whereby
reputation information is shared.  This thesis focuses on assessing the first two components
while defining a static communications protocol to ensure that each model is able to obtain
the same amount of information and therefore ensure fairness in comparison tests.
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In order to ascertain the utility of a particular mathematical model to represent reputation, we
have created a simulation environment has a theoretical upper limit for performance that an
ideal model would be able attain.  The simulated models were then compared to this ideal
model.  Simulations were then built from a variety of conditions including dramatically
changing environments and the use of deception.
We have proposed two methods of improving reputation systems to better handle changing
environments called Trust Level Management and Experience Windows.  In doing this we
have shown that learning and unlearning rates are key to the overall performance of a
reputation system, and that these goals are diametrically opposed.  Also, we demonstrate that
the process of learning and unlearning requires failure. This runs counter to the goal of Trust
Level Management, which is to minimize failure.  Experience Windows are useful in
handling dramatic changes to  the environment. However, eliminating information from the
reputation model can be a disadvantage if the window is too small. Overall, Trust Level
Management and Experience Windows are useful for tuning the performance of a reputation
model for certain environments.
11.3  Future Work
Given the generic simulation model develop here, there are many possibilities for possible
experimentation. Some of these include the following:
• Introducing groups and trust within groups to allow the experiment to scale to more
than 1000 agents.
• Modeling the behavior of communities instead of using even distributions of
population and interaction.
• Enabling chained references in order to accommodate a wider variety of simulation
models.
• Enabling agents to autonomously change strategies in order to achieve greater benefit.
• Allowing some kind of collaboration between deceptive agents.
Once potential reputation system candidates are identified for a given application, these
systems should be tested against real-world data to ensure that they are suitable for the actual
conditions in which they would be placed.
11.4  Conclusion
In conclusion, we have found that reputation systems are useful for predicting success of
interactions between two known or unknown parties.  However, a primary limitation of
reputation systems remains deception, and these models can only tolerate small amounts of
deception.  Additionally, when reputation systems are placed into environments which
change dramatically, they must unlearn prior behavior.  This unlearning process requires a
significant amount of failure before successes can be achieved in the new environment.
Instructing reputation agents to be shy when faced with a great deal of failure only increases
the time required to restore the system to success.  There may be no ideal mathematical
model for reputation, but through simulation we have shown ways in which these models can
be engineered and tuned to work well given a particular environment.
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